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"... to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the prop-
agation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."'
Thomas Jefferson
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past seventy-five years the Integrated Bar has been a ma-
jor concern to the profession and continues to be the subject of rather
heated discussion.2 The integrated bar is an association that all attor-
neys must join as a precondition to the granting of the privilege to
practice law.3 Many states, including Nebraska, have such integrated
bars. 4 Integration has come about through various means: legislation,5
court rule,6 or a combination of the two. 7 Regardless of the manner in
2. For example in a recent issue of the ABA Journal it was reported the California
State Bar has just recently been allowed to levy membership dues. However, the
measure also gives the state legislature review power over the bar and mandates
a poll of the state's lawyers to determine whether membership in the state bar
should be mandatory. See Silas, Getting its Due(s), A.B.A.J. April 1, 1986 at 26.
The state of California just recently completed the poll of its state bar members
to determine their views toward the integrated bar and the mandatory bar dues.
See REPORT BY THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, RESULTS OF THE PLEBI-
SCOTE OF MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (May 1986); see also Keller
v. State Bar of California, 181 Cal. App. 3d 471, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1986) (held that
first amendment principles prohibited state bar from requiring its members, as
condition of practicing law, to contribute to support of political or ideological
causes they opposed and which were not germane to purposes of State Bar Act);
Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 509 A.2d 753 (1986) (integrated bar would be
precluded from lobbying on issues outside the scope of those responsibilities
which justify compelling lawyers to belong to the association).
3. The integration movement is considered to have officially begun with an address
given by Herbert Harley, founder of the American Judicature Society, to the Lan-
caster County Bar Association in Lincoln, Nebraska on December 28, 1914. See D.
McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 34 (1963); Kalish, The Nebraska Supreme Court,
the Practice of Law and the Regulation of Attorneys, 59 NEB. L. REv. 555, 556
(1980).
4. Other cases and commentary have referred to the integrated bar as a unified bar,
organized bar, state bar, and incorporated bar. Regardless of the name attached to
it the integrated bar can be defined as an association of attorneys to which mem-
bership is required as a precondition to practicing law in the state. See McKEAN,
supra note 3, at 21-22. See also Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 27, 509 A.2d 753,
756 (1986).
5. States integrated through legislation and the years of their integration include:
Alabama (1923), Alaska (1955), Arizona (1933), California (1927), Idaho (1923),
Mississippi (1930), Nevada (1929), New Mexico (1925), North Carolina (1933),
North Dakota (1921), Oregon (1935), Puerto Rico (1932), South Dakota (1931),
Utah (1931), and Washington (1933). See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CITA-
TIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE INTEGRATED BAR IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2
(1961) [hereinafter BIBLIOGRAPHY].
6. States integrated through court rule and the years of their integration include:
Florida (1949), Missouri (1944), Nebraska (1937), Oklahoma (1939), and the Virgin
Islands (1956). See BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 5, at 1-2. See also Brookens, Judi-
cial Incorporation of the Bar, 12 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 209-14 (1940); Jones, Bar
Integration by Supreme Court Rule, 24 MARQUETTE LAW. REV. 90-92 (1940); Bar
Integration Endorsed, 4 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 44-47 (1920)(Extended discussion of the
power of the highest court of a state to integrate by rule of court).
7. States integrated through a combination of statute and court rule and the years of
their integration include: Kentucky (1934), Louisiana (1940), Michigan (1935),
1987)
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which the bar has become integrated there remain, however, common
characteristics of the integrated bar.
One such characteristic is that members of the bar must pay an-
nual dues to the association to support its activities.8 Integrated bars
are involved in many activities that range in scope and purpose. For
example, integrated bars oversee many aspects of the profession in-
cluding admission, discipline and prevention of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.9 The bar provides educational programs for its members
and the public. In addition, many bars lobby their state legislatures on
issues that may impact upon the bar, the lawyer and the profession.
However, the single most objectionable characteristic of the integrated
bar, to many, is the compelled financial support of its activities.
This article addresses the historical development of the integration
movement and the concerns that have been advanced by the propo-
nents as well as the opponents of integration. Focusing primarily on
the challenges to bar integration there will emerge an evolution of the
attack on the integrated bar. This evolution begins with the opposition
to the integration movement, followed by the total attack on the inte-
grated bar, and finally the acceptance of an integrated bar of limited
activities. I will also illustrate how the integration movement has been
quite a circuitus one; always returning to the issue of which activities
are appropriately those of the bar association. After discussing the his-
torical development of the integrated bar, I will address the more re-
cent challenge to the activities of the bar.
The current challenge to the integrated bar is the expenditure of
membership dues in a manner inconsistent with a dissident member's
beliefs. Decisions of the Supreme Court have addressed such a chal-
lenge in the labor context and provide guidance to the same issue
presented in the context of an integrated bar association. I will address
this current objection to the integrated bar, striving to incorporate the
recent cases and commentary into a manageable summary and analy-
sis of the charges against the integrated bar.
I conclude that the compelled financial support of a bar associa-
Texas (1939), Virginia (1938), West Virginia (1945), Wisconsin (1956), and Wyo-
ming (1939). See BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 5, at 1-2.
8. The annual dues for membership in the Nebraska State Bar Association are set
according to a sliding scale depending on the length a member has been in prac-
tice and the status of the individual. Current dues are: Active member - $150.00;
Judicial - $150.00; Junior Active - $75.00; Senior Active - $30.00; Inactive - $20.00
and Military is complimentary. See also REPORT, infra note 9.
9. The Nebraska State Bar Association, according to the 1985 annual report, was
made up of thirty-two committees in five divisions, ranging from the committee
on the annual meeting to the committee on forms standardization. See NE-
BRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE BAR DIRECTORY 275 (1985) (The annual




tion's activities that do not further a compelling governmental interest
impermissibly violates an objecting member's first amendment rights.
A proposed framework for analyzing the activities of the bar associa-
tion to distinguish between the legitimate activities (and the concomi-
tant financial support of those activities), and those activities which
are not proper bar association activities will then be explored. The
framework of analysis, which I propose, is a functional approach that
requires those activities which must be financially supported by all bar
association members be necessary to assure the proper functioning of
the judicial process. Such a test is one of strict necessity. Those activi-
ties of the bar that assure the proper functioning of the judicial pro-
cess further compelling state interests and justify the resulting first
amendment infringement; those activities that are not strictly neces-
sary to insure the functioning of the judicial process are not compel-
ling state interests and the bar connot compel their financial support
over the objection of a dissident member. This discussion of the issue
is more substantive; however, there remains a procedural aspect to the
compelled financial support of a bar association's activities.
If the conclusion is reached that a dissident bar member cannot be
compelled to financially support bar association activities which she
opposes, then there remains the issue of what is the proper remedy.
Short of prohibiting a bar from engaging in such activity,10 a system
must be established which will apportion the dues supporting such ac-
tivities. There must be a procedure devised which will assure that the
objecting member is paying for the activities of the bar that further a
compelling state interest, yet it must also provide for a process of ap-
portioning the dues and returning that portion which represents the
pro rata share spent unconstitutionally. This article proposes a proce-
dure that insures that unconstitutional bar expenditures are not being
compelled over objection and that a constitutional process is devel-
oped that will honor the constitutional rights of the dissident bar
member.
I propose a procedure which informs all members of their right to
object to bar expenditures and places this burden on the bar associa-
tion. Additionally, the procedure would require the bar to place the
dues of an objecting member into an escrow, or similar interest bear-
ing account until an accounting could be conducted. After the account-
ing, the bar association could assess to all members a percentage of its
costs representing those activities that have been determined to fur-
ther a compelling interest. All other activities of the bar must be fi-
nanced by voluntary contributions or through sources other than
compelled exactions from dissenting members. During the first year
in operation, the percentage of the dues that are appropriately com-
10. Such activity includes more than mere legislative lobbying.
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pelled would be set-off against the dues held in escrow, with the bal-
ance being returned along with the accrued interest to the dissident
member. In subsequent years, the dues assessed to dissident members
would be the amount which represented compelled assessments in the
previous year, with any shortfall being charged to the dissident and
any excess being returned, again with interest.
This procedural safeguard would be the least restrictive means of
furthering the compelling governmental interests served by some of
the activities of the integrated bars.
It should be pointed out that there are other objections to the inte-
grated bar which will not be addressed in this article. Such asserted
challenges include: the freedom of non-association which is infringed
through compelled membership;1 1 challenges involving taxation and
appropriation of bar dues without legislative action;12 and separation
of powers concerns which are implicated through bar integration.'3
Due to limitations of space these challenges will not be discussed in
this article.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
This portion of the article is not intended to be an exhaustive re-
statement of the events leading to the integration movement. It is,
however, necessary background discussion to illustrate the evolution
of the attacks on the integrated bar and the various forms those at-
tacks have taken. In addition, an understanding of the development of
the integration debate will be useful for a complete understanding of
the current challenge to compelled financial support of bar activities.
As mentioned previously, the bar integration movement has un-
dergone three distinct stages and has thus evolved from the total re-
jection of an integrated bar to the present acceptance of an integrated
bar of limited functions. The evolution of the integration debate has
been very circular. The question that remains unanswered after sev-
enty-five years of discussion is what are the appropriate duties and
11. See generally Compulsory Membership in a Bar Association, 34 JUD. 100 (1950);
Comment, The Right of Ideological Nonassociation, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 767 (1978);
Note, Constitutional Right of Non-Association-Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 633 (1978).
12. See generally Kalish, supra note 3 at 589-95. Ironically in a recent case involving
compelled financial support of a bar's lobbying activities the bar defended the
action urging that membership fees "are simply tax receipts which the govern-
ment may spend as it likes." Keller v. State Bar of California, 190 Cal. App. 3d
471, 1196, 1214, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448, 464 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Comment, Separation of Powers: Who should control the Bar? 47 J. URB.
L. 715 (1969); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice
of Law: A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1976). For an excellent
analysis of the separation of powers concerns with special emphasis on Nebraska
see Kalish, supra note 3.
[Vol. 66:762
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functions of the integrated bar associations? In this portion of the arti-
cle, I discuss the evolution of this recurring theme throughout the in-
tegration movement.
Bar integration has been shaped through select court decisions, and
extensive scholarly commentary. First a brief summary of the events
leading up to the widespread integration of voluntary state bar as-
sociations will be discussed, followed by the major cases that have im-
pacted upon the movement. The primary cases that have had an
impact on the early stages of the integrated bars are Lathrop v. Dono-
hue' 4 and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.15 The Lathrop and
Abood decisions will be discussed in the sections that follow.
A. Early Integration History
The integrated bar movement began in the early 1900s and is con-
sidered to have officially commenced as a result of a speech given by
Herbert Harley in 1914.16 Although the early integration movement is
often characterized as a debate, the commentary during the formative
years of integration history is noticeably skewed in favor of the inte-
gration proponents. This can be explained when one looks at the au-
thors and the sponsors of the early commentary.
For example, Herbert Harley, who began the integration debate,
had control of a very influential vehicle which was devoted to the inte-
gration of the voluntary state bar associations. As founder of the
American Judicature Society, Harley was able to exert a great deal of
pressure in favor of integration. Indeed, one need only scan the early
issues of Judicature, published by the American Judicature Society, to
get a sense of the position held by the American Judicature Society on
bar integration.17 Further, many of the authors that advocated the
integration of voluntary associations were themselves members and
officers of the voluntary associations. With the resources available to
begin a campaign for integration, these sponsors influenced the move-
ment tremendously.
The institutional sponsors of the early literature on integration
were usually the voluntary bar associations which had a great deal to
14. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
15. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Mr. Harley's address was entitled "A
Lawyer's Trust: An Agreement for a Self-Governing and Responsible Bar." See
Harley, A Lawyer's Trust, 29 JuDIcATURE 50 (1945).
17. The American Judicature Society also prepared and published a bibliography on
bar integration. The foreword of the bibliography claims to present both sides of
the movement, however, most of the literature is favorable to the integration
movement. Indeed most of the articles referenced were published by Judicature.
This may be explained by the bias of the American Judicature Society or by the
fact that early literature on bar integration was skewed towards integration. See
generally BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 5.
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gain through integration.18 Through integration, voluntary associa-
tions would be strengthened "by bolstering memberships, finances,
and influence."1 9 Most of the voluntary associations published jour-
nals that provided the integration proponents with easy access to print
media. With this unbalanced state of the early commentary it is under-
standable why so few attorneys opposed the integration of their volun-
tary state bars.
A number of arguments have traditionally been advanced for and
against the integrated bar.20 The arguments in favor of an integrated
bar can be broken into two components: first, arguments based upon
the public interest; and second, arguments based upon the self-interest
of the bar associations and attorneys.
This first category includes the following reasons for bar integra-
tion: improving the competency, standards, and image of the profes-
sion; effective discipline and enforcement of ethical standards;
improving the administration of justice; protecting the public interest
by monitoring legislation; furthering the bar's duties of public respon-
sibility (e.g., client security funds, making legal services available,
etc.); eliminating "freeloaders" in the profession (i.e., lawyers who do
not fulfill their public responsibilities); and effectively promoting judi-
cial reform legislation.21
The second category of arguments advanced for the integrated bar
appeals to the self-interest of the bar association and the lawyer. Ex-
amples of arguments of this type include: increased membership in the
bar and improved financial resources through integration; better par-
ticipation, diversity of viewpoints and quality of work resulting from
integration; elimination of clique control common in voluntary bar as-
sociations; improving public perception and attitudes regarding attor-
neys; improving the economic position of lawyers through the
institution of minimum fee schedules; benefitting local voluntary bar
associations; promotion of self-government and self-discipline by the
18. For example the Nebraska Bar Association, now the Nebraska State Bar Associa-
tion, in 1933 established a special committee on integration of the bar. See 24 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 41 (Thirty-Fourth Annual
Meeting of Nebraska State Bar Association 1933).
19. Sorenson, The Integrated Bar and the Freedom of Nonassociation - Continuing
Seige, 63 NEB. L. REV. 30, 35 (1983).
20. For a complete discussion of the pros and cons of bar integration see Curtis, The
Pros and Cons of an Integrated Bar, 12 LAW Soc'y J. 103 (1946-47); Harley, Does
$3 a Year Mean Regimentation, 13 FLA. L.J. 39 (1939); Vogl, Why Lawyers
Should Oppose Bar Integration, 20 DICTA 63 (1943); Wicker Pros and Cons of an
Integrated Bar, 23 TENN. L. REV. 457 (1954-55).
21. Sorenson, supra note 19, at 36. Several of these justifications, while serving the
public interest, also inure to the benefit of the bar and the self-interest of the
members of the bar. And while many consider these activities to be proper, I
believe that some of them raise serious constitutional problems, especially moni-
toring and promoting legislation.
[Vol. 66:762
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legal profession through unification; providing the mechanism by
which lawyers can speak with one voice on important public and social
issues; and protecting lawyers by providing a mechanism to monitor
legislation that may affect their professional interests.22
This category of pro-integration arguments is more likely to raise
objections by dissident bar members than any other. These arguments,
based upon the self-interest of the bar associations and the individual
attorney, do not promote any governmental goals and therefore com-
pelled financial support of activities that further them are likely to
meet opposition. Activities which further the self-interest of the bar
and the attorney without regard to the governmental interest in regu-
lating attorneys are those that would fail the functional test proposed
in this article.
Responding to the arguments of the proponents, the anti-integra-
tionists also entered the debate with their own. Opponents of bar inte-
gration asserted a multitude of arguments supporting their position:
compulsory membership in the bar deprived attorneys of the freedom
of choice; integration was the equivalent to regimentation; integration
increased bureaucracy and the tax burden; integration deprived attor-
neys of property without due process and imposed a form of involun-
tary servitude; free speech rights were infringed by the bar; the
integrated bar was like a "closed shop"; integration was motivated by
economic self-interest and guildism; integration gave state power to a
private interest group which advocated legal reform carrying broad
social implications; the integrated bar was not responsive to captive
members' desires and needs; excessive influence by specialized minor-
ity interests or a power clique would result from bar integration; com-
pulsion would not cure attorney apathy; integration would cause
rigidity in the profession; and even if the integrated bar was limited to
lobbying activities related to the administration of justice, it was often
impossible to distinguish administration of justice from broad public
policy.23
The opponents of bar integration stressed the rights and autonomy
of the attorney as an individual. The opponents, however, were in the
minority and the proponents won the battle, although not necessarily
the war. These arguments, both pro and con, provide an understand-
ing of the early stages of the integration movement and its underlying
rationales. They illustrate the first stage in the evolution of the inte-
gration debate, a stage marked by heated debate and commentary.
Proponents sought an expansive integrated bar, while opponents ral-
lied against the integrated bar in its entirety. This stage represents the
22. Id. at 37.
23. Id. at 39.
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formation of the integration movement and the early adoption of the
integrated bar by many states.
Although the anti-integrationists were against the whole notion of
an integrated bar, their position became indefensible after the
Supreme Court's decision in Lathrop v. Donohue.24
B. Lathrop v. Donohue
In Lathrop v. Donohue 25 the Supreme Court held that a state may
require an attorney to become a member and pay reasonable annual
dues to an integrated bar association in order to practice law within
the state. This was the first case in which the Court dealt with the
constitutional challenge to the integrated bar association. Lathrop was
heralded as the end to the challenge of the integrated bar. However, it
has been recognized that Lathrop did not decide whether an attorney
can be forced to provide financial support for integrated bar activities
with which she disagrees.2 6
Lathrop involved the freedom of association which is implicated
through bar integration. Lathrop, a Wisconsin attorney, challenged
the constitutionality of the Wisconsin integrated bar based on the first
amendment freedoms of speech, press, and assembly that are applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 27 Lathrop ar-
gued that there was a freedom not to associate that was violated when
the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered him and all other Wisconsin
lawyers to pay annual dues of $15 in order to practice law.28 Lathrop
also opposed the activities that the bar association supported with the
compulsory dues.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had ordered integration of
the bar,29 concluded that integration did not violate Lathrop's right of
association and that his rights to free speech were not violated because
the state bar used his membership dues to support legislation with
24. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
25. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Lathrop the reader should consult Com-
ment, The Integrated Bar After Lathrop v. Donohue - Integration or Disintegra-
tion, 11 CATH. U.L. REV. 85 (1962).
26. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 847-48, where the Court stated "[w]e, there-
fore, intimate no view as to the correctness of the conclusion... that the appel-
lant may constitutionally be compelled to contribute his financial support to
political activities which he opposes." See also Sorenson, supra note 19.
27. Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960).
28. Id. at 236-37, 102 N.W.2d at 407-08. See also Lathrop, 367 U.S. 820, where Mr. Lath-
rop attached to his complaint a copy of a letter which read, "I do not like to be
coerced to support an organization which is authorized and directed to engage in
political and propaganda activities .... A major portion of the activities of the
State Bar as prescribed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin are of a political and
propaganda nature." Id. at 822.
29. The Wisconsin Supreme Court integrated the state bar by court order on January
1, 1957. See In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956).
(Vol. 66:762
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which he disagreed. Lathrop appealed the decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision.
Writing for a plurality, Justice Brennan concluded that Lathrop's
argument was essentially one of freedom of association. "[A]ppellant's
argument is that he cannot constitutionally be compelled to join and
give support to an organization which has among its functions the ex-
pression of opinion on legislative matters and which utilizes its prop-
erty, funds, and employees for the purposes of influencing legislation
and public opinion toward legislation."3 0 The plurality responded
that Lathrop was not being forced to associate with anyone and that
the only compulsion he was subjected to was the payment of the $15
annual dues.31
In the summary dismissal of Lathrop's freedom of association
claim the Court dealt a major blow to the opponents of integration.
The claim that the integrated bar was unconstitutional in its entirety
became untenable.3 2 Thus, the second stage of the integration debate
began. Opponents now had to accept an integrated bar, although possi-
bly one of limited functions. The Lathrop case also gave rise to the
basis for the current development in the bar integration debate. Lath-
rop discussed, but did not decide, whether a bar association could com-
pel dues for activities with which some of its members disagreed.
Although not deciding the question, the opinion did provide certain
policy considerations implicated by this question.
The Court stated that the only issue confronting it was the "com-
pelled financial support of group activities, not with involuntary mem-
bership in any other respect." 33 In addressing Lathrop's claims the
30. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 827 (1961).
31. Id. at 828. The Court followed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
which held that the only compulsion exerted on Lathrop was the payment of $15
annual dues to the state bar. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 102
N.W.2d 404, 408 (1960).
32. However, one scholar writing on the Wisconsin integrated bar has suggested that
the concept of an integrated bar may still be unconstitutional in its entirety. See
T. ScHNEYER, THE INCOHERENCE OF THE UNIFIED BAR CONCEPT- GENERALIZING
FROM THE WISCONSIN CASE (American Bar Foundation 1983). Noting that the
Court did not decide whether compelled bar dues could be spent over a dissident
member's objection, Schneyer argued that in light of this constitutional challenge
and the existing infringements on associational rights, the Court if considering
these challenges together may still find the integrated bar to be unconstitutional.
Id. at 67.
33. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 828 (1961). The Court also referred to two pre-
vious decisions which have addressed this issue although in the labor union con-
text. See International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)
(decided the same day as Lathrop); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956). For a complete discussion of Hanson and Street and their relevance to
Lathrop and the integrated bar the reader should consult SCHNEYER, supra note
32, at 25-40; Sorenson, supra note 19, at 40-45. The Court's decision in Hanson
1987]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Court relied on Railway Employee's Department v. Hanson,34 where
it held that the Railway Labor Act "did not on its face abridge pro-
tected rights of association in authorizing union-shop agreements be-
tween interstate railroads and unions of their employees conditioning
the employees' continued employment on payment of union dues, ini-
tiation fees, and assessments." 35 In linking the integrated bar to the
labor union agreements in Hanson, the Court would uphold the as-
sessment of a reasonable fee by the integrated bar if it served a com-
pelling state policy.
The Court examined the activities of the Wisconsin State Bar and
found them to be related to a sufficient state interest in the regulation
of the legal profession.
Both in purpose and in practice the bulk of State Bar activities serve the func-
tion, or at least so Wisconsin might reasonably believe, of elevating the educa-
tional and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of
the legal service available to the people of the state, without any reference to
the political process. It cannot be denied that this is a legitimate end of state
policy.3
6
The Court, therefore, upheld the integrated bar and the assess-
ment of annual dues to support its activities. In addition the Court
identified important governmental interests for which a state bar
could compel financial support from its members.
The Court, however, did not decide whether using bar association
dues to support political purposes would violate the Constitution. "We
are persuaded that on this record we have no sound basis for deciding
appellant's constitutional claim insofar as it rests on the assertion that
his rights of free speech are violated by the use of his money for causes
which he opposes."'37 The record did not provide any information as
to the activities of the State Bar to which Lathrop objected and there-
linked the fate of the integrated bar to that of the union shops. Justice Douglas,
writing for a unanimous Court stated "[o]n the present record, there is no more
an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be
in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an inte-
grated bar." Railway Employee's Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956). How-
ever, Justice Douglas later remarked that "on reflection the analogy fails."
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 879 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
35. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 842 (1961). A union shop agreement requires
that all affected employees must actually join the union, maintain their member-
ship, and pay union dues, as a condition of their employment. An agency shop
agreement is one under which affected employees are not required to actually
become members of the union, but are required to pay "service fees" bearing a
relationship to union dues to help defray the collective bargaining costs of the
agent-union which acts as the exclusive bargaining agent of all affected employ-
ees, union members and non-members alike. See generally 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor
and Labor Relations, §§ 12-20, 355-56, 361 (1979).
36. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961).
37. Id. at 845.
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fore the issue was not concretely presented for adjudication.38
The plurality of four justices found that the annual dues were not
on their face unconstitutional relying on the analogy to Hanson, that
the constitutional issues tendered were not ripe for adjudication. The
other five members of the Court disagreed with the plurality and be-
lieved the constitutional issues should be adjudicated. Three justices,
Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whittaker, would have upheld the
constitutionality of using compulsory dues to finance the state bar ac-
tivities even where those activities were opposed by dissident mem-
bers.39 The other two justices, Justices Black and Douglas, would
have held such activities to be unconstitutional.40
The only proposition on which a majority of the Court in Lathrop
agreed was that the constitutional issues should be reached. However,
due to the disparate views of those five justices on the merits and the
failure of the other four members of the Court to discuss the constitu-
tional questions, Lathrop does not provide a clear holding to guide the
adjudication of the constitutional issues presented in this article. A
clear ruling on these constitutional issues did not come until the
Court's ruling in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.41
C. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
The Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education42
marks the beginning of the third, and current, stage in the integration
debate. Abood provided the anti-integrationists with the needed prece-
dent to make a persuasive challenge to the compelled financial sup-
port of activities which are opposed by dissenting members of the bar.
In Abood the Court stated it was confronted with the constitutional
issue not decided in Hanson, Street or Lathrop - the use of union-
shop fees and bar association dues for political and ideological pur-
38. The language in Lathrop led some to believe that in order to challenge the activi-
ties of a bar association the dissident must, with much specificity, allege precisely
those activities which he opposed. This view was later rejected by the Court in
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). See infra note 136, and accom-
panying text.
39. See Latbrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 848 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in judg-
ment and joined by Frankfurter, J.); id. at 877 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 865 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 877 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. 431 U.S. 209, reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
42. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For a general discussion of Abood, see Gaebler, First Amend-
ment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23
B.C. L. REv. 995 (1982); Mitchell, Public Sector Union Security: The Impact of
Abood, 29 LAB. L.J. 697 (1978); Note, Constitutional Limits on the Use of Contri-
butions Compelled under Agency Shop Agreements, 38 LA. L. REV. 850 (1978). See
Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 29, 509 A.2d 753, 757 (1986) ("At the outset, we
note that the constitutionality of the integrated, or unified bar, is not at issue here
.... [Tihe success of such a challenge is made all the more unlikely by decisions
of both the United States Supreme Court and this court .... ").
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poses unrelated to collective bargaining and proper bar association
activities.43
Abood involved a Michigan statute which authorized an "agency
shop" arrangement between unions and local government employ-
ers.44 Under this arrangement every employee represented by a
union, even though not a union member, must pay to the union, as a
condition of employment, a service charge equal in amount to the
union dues. A group of teachers filed actions against the Detroit Board
of Education and the Teachers Union challenging the union-shop
agreement. The objections of the teachers stemmed from allegations
that the union engaged "in a number and variety of activities and pro-
grams which are economic, political, professional, scientific and reli-
gious in nature of which.. .[they]... do not approve."45 The teachers
sought a ruling by the Supreme Court that the agency-shop agreement
violated the constitutional protections of, among others, the freedom
of association protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Court in Abood, as in Lathrop, relied heavily on its decisions in
Hanson and Street. "Consideration of the question whether an agency-
shop provision in a collective-bargaining agreement covering govern-
mental employees is, as such, constitutionally valid must begin with
two cases in this Court that on their face go far toward resolving the
issue. The cases are Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson46 and
Machinists v. Street."47 In Hanson the Court made it very clear that
"the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining
agency by all who receive the benefits of its work.., does not violate
... the First Amendment." 48 However, in Hanson, the Court did not
have to decide the issue presented in Abood. Hanson only expressed
an opinion with reference to fees assessed for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining; Hanson did not discuss the assessment of fees for pur-
poses unrelated to collective bargaining.
Later in Street, the Court again faced the issue decided in Hanson.
In Street, however, the record contained findings that the union treas-
43. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-33 n.29 (1977).
44. Id. at 211. For a distinction between the "union shop" in Hanson and Street and
the "agency shop" in Abood, see supra note 35.
45. Id. at 213.
46. 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (involving a group of railroad employees that brought an ac-
tion in a Nebraska court to enjoin enforcement of a union-shop agreement). See
supra note 33 and accompanying text. The record in Hanson contained no evi-
dence that union dues were used to force ideological conformity. In Hanson the
Court upheld the union-shop agreement and in addressing the first amendment
challenge stated "[i]f 'assessments' are in fact imposed for purposes not germane
to collective bargaining, a different problem would be presented." Id. at 235 (foot-
note omitted).
47. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 214 (1977), and
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
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ury to which all employees were required to contribute had been used
to "finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices
whom [the plaintiffs] opposed, and to promote the propagation of
political and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which
[they] disagree."4 9 The Court construed the Railway Labor Act so as
to avoid the constitutional issues although recognizing that the consti-
tutional issues were "questions of the utmost gravity."50 The Court
held that the expenditure of funds for political purposes violated the
Act itself and that compulsory dues could only be used for purposes
germane to collective bargaining.51
In Hanson, Street, and Abood the Court was especially concerned
with "free riders" in the collective bargaining context.5 2 Free riders
are those who "refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining bene-
fits of union representation that necessarily accrues [sic] to all employ-
ees."5 3 Although recognizing that compelling financial support of the
union collective-bargaining activities may very well involve an impact
on first amendment rights, the Court held that such "interference as
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the
important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor rela-
tions established by Congress."" This is significant because the free
rider problem is one of the arguments that has been advanced for an
integrated bar. The Court's concern with the free rider problem may
also be one of the factors behind its decision in Lathrop, which upheld
the assessment of a reasonable fee to the bar. This argument, however,
is not persuasive when the activities that are opposed, and their finan-
cial support, do not promote any interest the government may have in
regulating the legal profession. This issue was not decided in Lathrop.
Abood differed from Hanson and Street, however, and went beyond
the free rider problem because Abood's complaint alleged, and the
Michigan Court of Appeals ruled, that state law "sanctions the use of
nonunion members' fees for purposes other than collective bargain-
ing."5 5 Therefore the Court was required to address the constitutional
issues that were left open in Hanson, Street, and Lathrop.
The Court accepted Abood's argument that he may prevent the
union from spending a part of his "required service fees to contribute
to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its
49. Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 744 (1961).
50. Id. at 749.
51. Such activities included negotiating and administering the collective-bargaining
agreement and adjusting grievances and disputes. See Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 768 (1961).
52. This has been one of the reasons traditionally advanced to support bar integra-
tion. See supra note 20, and accompanying text.
53. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
54. Id.
55. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 99, 230 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1975).
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duties as exclusive bargaining representative." 56 In reaching this re-
sult the Court stated that the government cannot prevent a person
from contributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a
political message and the fact that Abood is "compelled to make,
rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political pur-
poses works no less an infringement [on his] constitutional rights."57
In clarifying its decision the Court stated:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the ex-
pression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the ad-
vancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-
bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such
expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employ-
ees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into
doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental
employment.5
8
The Court recognized its decision would create difficult problems
in "drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities, for which
contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to
collective-bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited." 59
This discussion of Hanson, Street, Lathrop, and Abood brings us up
to date on the cases that have developed the integration debate and
have shaped the current challenge. There have not been any post-
Abood Supreme Court decisions which have addressed these cases in
the context of a bar association. However, several state and federal
courts have been grappling with this issue and have dealt with it in the
post-Abood years. This article will now address these decisions and
how the courts have dealt with this difficult constitutional issue.
III. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO
THE INTEGRATED BAR
This portion of the article deals specifically with the propriety of
using required fees paid to an integrated bar association for particular
actions, such as lobbying or political activities, which are not approved
of by some of the members of the association.60 This current chal-
56. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 235-36.
59. Id. at 236.
60. See generally Annotation, Use of Compulsory Bar Association Dues or Fees for
Activities From Which Particular Members Dissent, 40 A.L.R.4TH 672 (1985).
Some scholars have argued that if the integrated bar is limited to only those activ-
ities allowed under the principles of Abood then the integrated bar may cease to
exist. See, e.g., SCHNEYER, supra note 32, at 57-68; Sorenson, supra note 19, at 34.
Although lobbying and political activities are the clearest examples of improper
bar activities, I do not want to leave the impression that these are the only activi-
ties that may fail constitutional scrutiny. These are, however, the clearest exam-
ples because they involve elements of ideology and thus implicate negative first
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lenge to the integrated bar is not new; similar challenges have been
made for several years.6 1 However, the recent Supreme Court prece-
dents which have already been discussed have added credibility to the
challenge and have renewed the debate.62
A. Recent Case Law
A handful of state and federal court decisions have specifically ad-
dressed this issue with varying results. It is hoped that in analyzing
these recent cases an analytical framework will emerge which will
provide: (1) a test to determine if bar dues can be compelled over ob-
jection; and (2) a method to determine which activities of the bar can
legitimately be financed through compelled financial support of a dis-
senting bar member. The first decision of this type is Arrow v. Dow.63
In Arrow a group of New Mexico State Bar members brought an
action challenging the use of mandatory bar dues to lobby for or
against legislation in the New Mexico Legislature. The plaintiffs, dissi-
dent bar members, claimed deprivations of freedom of speech and as-
sociation through the use of their bar dues for purposes which they
opposed.64 Plaintiffs sought restitution of their bar dues spent for
those purposes and also injunctive relief.
Since 1977 portions of the New Mexico State Bar Association dues
have been used to finance lobbyists which lobby for or against "issues
which the Bar, by its president, finds to be germane to the purposes
for which the Bar was formed."65 The bar claimed that the use of the
mandatory dues to support lobbyist activity did not violate any first
amendment rights of the plaintiffs and, alternatively, any first amend-
ment infringement was outweighted by the important governmental
interests served by the bar and its activities.66
The district court relied on the leading Supreme Court cases of
amendment rights when a position of the bar association is imputed to a dissent-
ing member. Innocuous or politically neutral bar activities may violate the con-
stitution, although the violation is not as great.
61. See, e.g., Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497,169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914
(1970).
62. The debate in Nebraska has become even more heated, in part, due to a poll of
the state bar membership conducted in the Fall of 1986 by the author of this
article. The results of this poll will be made available to those who request them
from the Nebraska Law Review and pay a fee to meet reproduction costs.
63. 544 F. Supp. 458 (D. N.M. 1982). See also Arrow v. Dow, 554 F. Supp. 1086 (D.
N.M. 1983).
64. Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 459 (D. N.M. 1982).
65. Id. It seems that the bar association president also read the Abood decision since
he adopted the Court's language when referring to the bar's lobbying activities as
"germane" to the purposes for which the bar was integrated, and that this has
been the case since 1977, the year Abood was decided. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. at 209, 235-36 (1977).
66. Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 459-60 (D. N.M. 1982).
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Hanson, Street, Lathrop, and Abood, discussed supra. The court recog-
nized that Hanson and Street upheld compelled financial support of
collective bargaining activities under union-shop agreements and that
Lathrop allowed mandatory bar membership along with compelled fi-
nancial support without any first amendment infringement. However
the court also considered the Supreme Court's decision in Abood and
found there to be no significant distinction between the question
presented in Abood and the compelled financial support of bar associa-
tion activities. 67
After deciding that Abood controlled its decision the court was
faced with only one remaining question. The court phrased the ques-
tion in the following manner:
Are society's interests in the State Legislature being informed of the views of
the majority of lawyers on issues which may reasonably be expected to pro-
mote the administration of justice or improvement of the legal system impor-
tant governmental interests which justify the infringement upon plaintiffs'
rights occasioned by the use of Bar dues to finance lobbying efforts?
68
The court concluded that the lobbying activities of the bar did not
serve important governmental interests as contemplated in Abood.
The bar unsuccessfully argued that the activities were related to the
administration of justice and the improvement of the legal system.
The court responded to this argument by stating that "[t]he standard
urged by the Bar is an all-encompassing exception to the rule of Abood
.... The standard is too broad."69 The court further stated that it
could not conclude that "advancing the administration of justice or im-
proving the legal system are equivalent in the context of a Bar Associ-
ation, to collective bargaining activities in the context of a labor
union."70
This conclusion is also correct under the functional test which is
proposed in the following section of this article. The lobbying activities
of the bar were not strictly necessary to assure the proper functioning
of the judicial process. Further, the lobbying activities could be fi-
nanced by less restrictive means such as voluntary contributions or
through voluntary bar associations without any first amendment in-
fringement. The bar speaking as a unified group with one voice is not a
sufficiently compelling reason under a functional test to justify any
first amendment infringements. 71
67. Id. at 461. Indeed the Supreme Court in Abood recognized that it was confronted
with the issue left unanswered in Lathrop. See Abood v. Detriot Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209 (1977). See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
68. Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 462 (D. N.M. 1982).
69. Id. at 462.
70. Id.
71. Thus, even the taking of a position by a bar association without actually appropri-
ating money to advocate the position may violate the Constitution. The bar as-
sociations seem to miss the point of a dissenting member's objections. It is
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The court did not, however, provide any sort of test or analysis to
flesh out those activities for which the bar may compel financial sup-
port from those that it cannot.
I conclude that the Bar may exact dues to support only those duties and func-
tions of the bar which serve important or compelling governmental interests. I
do not attempt to delineate all functions and duties of the Bar which do serve
important governmental interests, I do conclude that lobbying efforts at issue
in this case did not serve such important governmental interests.7 2
Although not proposing a test the court did cite approvingly to the
language in Lathrop which suggested that those activities which
would justify first amendment infringement were those that were
"improving the ethical and educational standards of lawyers without
reference to the political process."73
The Arrow decision was one of the first cases to address this ques-
tion framed in a manner similar to Abood. Several other courts have
also followed Arrow's reliance on Abood, with varying conclusions.
There are two Michigan Supreme Court decisions which are the
result of a dissident bar member, Falk, objecting to the manner in
which his compulsory dues were spent.74 In both decisions the court
was split and several opinions were filed, nevertheless the opinions
which were filed in Falk I, and later in Falk II, provide useful analysis
and will be discussed in great detail. The opinions in the Falk tandem
represent differing methods of analyzing the constitutional issue
presented by compelled financial support of a bar association's
activities.
The issue presented in Falk 175 was identical to the issue presented
in Arrow. Mr. Falk brought an action challenging the compelled finan-
cial support of bar activities which he felt were unconstitutionally vio-
lating his first amendment rights.76 Although the court ordered
further evidentiary hearings to develop the record with regard to cer-
generally not only the fact that $7.58 out of the $150.00 regular dues assessment
will be used for lobbying that offends dissenters; it is this plus the fact that the
bar's official positions will be imputed to the dissenters. See REPORT OF SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON NSBA POLICY ON LEGISLATION at 7 (Sept 14, 1987) [hereinafter
SENNETT COMMITTEE REPORT]. Thus, even a dues check-off does not cure the un-
derlying constitutional infringement. As long as the bar takes an official position,
an argument can be made that there is a constitutional violation. Given this ob-
servation, the best course of action to remedy a dissenter's constitutional depriva-
tions would be to prohibit a bar association from taking official positions on such
matters.
72. Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. N.M. 1982).
73. Id. at 462 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1960)) (emphasis sup-
plied). See also Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 30, 509 A.2d 753, 762 (1986).
74. Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981) [hereinafter Falk
1], petition dismissed, 418 Mich. 270, 342 N.W.2d 504 (1983) [hereinafter Falk II],
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984).
75. 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981).
76. The State Bar of Michigan was integrated through legislation. See 1935 Mich.
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tain bar activities, the court did address the legal principles involved in
the case.
There was no majority opinion of the court for a decision and
therefore the matter was remanded. However, three opinions were
filed by the court. The first two opinions will now be discussed. The
third opinion by Justice Levin and joined by Justice Kavanagh dis-
cusses the problem but provides little guidance and hence will not be
discussed in this article.77
The first opinion, authored by Justice Ryan and joined by Justices
Moody and Fitzgerald, began by stating:
The State of Michigan, through the combined actions of the Supreme Court,
the Legislature, and the State Bar, may compulsorily exact dues, and require
association, to support only those duties and functions of the State Bar which
serve a compelling state interest and which cannot be accomplished by means
less intrusive upon First Amendment rights of the objecting individuals
affected.7 8
By using such key phrases as "compelling state interest" and "less in-
trusive means," Justice Ryan made it clear from the outset what type
of test he would employ.
Justice Ryan, as did the court in Arrow, looked to the Supreme
Court decisions in Hanson, Street, Lathrop, and Abood to guide his de-
cision. After a rather detailed discussion of the holdings in Hanson,
Street, and Lathrop, Justice Ryan recognized that although not de-
cided on first amendment grounds these cases provided useful, albeit
limited, guidance.
Justice Ryan also carefully considered the principles enunciated in
Abood, while recognizing that the guidance provided by Abood was
limited. "While the decision in Abood is of primary significance to the
instant case, it does not offer a clear statement of the controlling
framework for analysis of First Amendment issues of the kind here
presented."79
Pub. Acts 58; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.901 (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.901
(Callaghan 1966).
77. Justice Levin's opinion, joined by Justice Kavanagh, agreed that at some point
the interests of the bar and the state must yield to the constitutional freedoms of
the individual lawyer. However, he would not have defined that point on the rec-
ord before the court. "We emphasize that the Court is not now deciding, nor inti-
mating an opinion on, either the appropriate standard of judicial scrutiny or a
definition of the state interests served by the bar." Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 177, 305
N.W. 2d 201, 247 (1981).
78. Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 84, 305 N.W.2d 201, 202 (1981) (emphasis supplied). Because
of some inadequacies in the pleadings Justice Ryan's opinion, as well as the other
two opinions filed in the case, interpreted Falk's petition as a "complaint for a
writ of superintending control over the State Bar of Michigan." Id. at 86, 305
N.W.2d at 203. For a very recent case which follows a similar analysis see Gibson
v. The Fla. Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11th Cir. 1986); but see The Fla. Bar, 439 So.
2d 213 (Fla. 1983).
79. Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 106, 305 N.W.2d 201, 213 (1981).
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Therefore, relying on the Supreme Court decision of Elrod v.
Burns8 0 the court addressed the controlling principles. Elrod involved
a constitutional challenge to a patronage system in a county sheriff's
department which required employees to become affiliated with or
sponsored by the political party in control of the sheriff's office, or
face possible discharge. Justice Brennan's opinion in the plurality de-
cision stated that such a practice violated the first amendment even
though a governmental benefit is not a right and can be denied for
various reasons. Justice Brennan maintained that there are some rea-
sons upon which a governmental benefit cannot be denied.81 He then
noted that a first amendment infringement must be analyzed under a
strict scrutiny test, rejecting a rational basis test, and that the govern-
mental action must be closely drawn so as not to unduly infringe upon
first amendment rights.
Accepting these well settled principles Justice Ryan sought to
analyze the activities of the bar association to which Falk objected.
Recognizing that the state has a strong interest in regulating attor-
neys, and potentially a compelling interest, the infringement of consti-
tutional rights must nevertheless be "consciously and scrupulously
minimized."8 2
We therefore conclude ... the State Bar, may compulsorily exact dues, and
require association, to support only those duties and functions of the State Bar
which serve compelling state interests and which cannot be accomplished by
means less intrusive upon the First Amendment rights of objecting individual
attorneys.
8 3
In the "Findings, Conclusions, and Relief" Justice Ryan stated:
[Tihe regulation of the practice of law, the maintenance of high standards in
the legal profession, and the discharge of the profession's duty to protect and
inform the public are, in the context of the present challenge, purposes in
which the State of Michigan has a compelling interest which will justify una-
voidable intrusions on the First Amendment rights of objecting attorneys.8 4
80. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
81. Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 106-07, 305 N.W.2d 201, 213 (1981) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 360-63 (1976)) See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court
rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' Id. at 404.
82. Falk I, 411 MAich. 63, 112, 305 N.W.2d 201, 216 (1981).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 114, 305 N.W.2d at 217. The court proceeded to list those activities which
serve a compelling interest and cannot be accomplished by means less intrusive to
first amendment rights. That list included: all regulatory and licensing activities,
continuing legal education activities, publication of the Michigan Bar Journal,
maintenance of a client security fund, community legal education projects, and
lawyer referral services. Id. at 114-16, 305 N.W.2d at 217. Those activities that
failed to promote a compelling interest were: rendering technical advice to the
legislature, testifying before state bodies, taking and promoting positions on legis-
lation, retaining a lobbyist, activities designed to further the commercial and eco-




Therefore the opinion followed an analysis similar to that in Ar-
row. However, the opinion merely stated conclusions, providing no
analysis or reasoning which might be useful in future cases.
In the second opinion Justice Williams, joined by Chief Justice
Coleman, opined that Falk was not entitled to relief. Justice Williams
would have held the activities of the state bar served a compelling in-
terest with the exception of the use of the State Bar mailing list for
commercial solicitations, which violated the right to privacy. While
agreeing first amendment rights are not absolute, it was conceded that
the state must have a compelling state interest in order to justify any
infringement. However, a new test was proposed to review the means
employed to promote the governmental state interest. Rejecting the
least restrictive means test, Abood was read to apply a less stringent
test, referred to as the "germane" test.8 5 Such a test would be applied
in cases where the first amendment infringement is indirect as op-
posed to direct. The opinion continued: "Therefore we believe that the
appropriate test to analyze petitioner's constitutional challenges is
whether the state has a compelling interest involved, and if so,
whether the Bar's complained-of activities are germane to that inter-
est."8 6 The opinion found the state to have a compelling interest in
regulating the profession and then proceeded to determine if the activ-
ities complained of were germane to this interest.
Justice Williams identified the state's compelling interest as ad-
vancing the science of jurisprudence and the efficient administration
of justice, and without elaboration, held that ten of the eleven acts
objected to were germane to this compelling interest.8 7 The summary
treatment of the objectionable activities indicates that Justice Wil-
liams has a very broad concept of the "administration of justice and
advancement of jurisprudence." Under such a broad standard almost
any activity of the bar could be considered germane to the state's in-
terest, including, for example, a lawyer placement service, a lawyer's
wives organization, and bar social functions. Recognizing that such ac-
tivities are not, in and of themselves, compelling interests, Justice Wil-
liams nevertheless determined they were germane to the overriding
governmental interest which was compelling.8 8 The only challenged
activity of the bar which the opinion found to violate the dissident bar
member's rights was the selling of the bar membership mailing list for
commercial purposes by the bar.8 9 The opinion held this activity vio-
85. Id. at 137-38, 305 N.W.2d at 226-27.
86. Id. at 138, 305 N.W.2d at 227-228 (emphasis supplied).
87. Id. at 142-61, 305 N.W.2d 230-38. See Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 43, 509
A.2d 753, 766 (1986) (Justice Batchelder, dissenting) (a similarly expansive read-
ing of "administration of justice").
88. Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 159-60, 305 N.W.2d 201, 237-38 (1981).
89. Id. at 161-64, 305 N.W.2d at 239-40.
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lated the right to privacy.
Although the two opinions just discussed would have reached dif-
fering results, they nevertheless have a great deal of similarities. The
analysis employed in both opinions followed a traditional constitu-
tional analysis relying on established principles. The only noticeable
dissimilarity was the rejection of the least restrictive means compo-
nent of the traditional strict scrutiny analysis and the use of the "ger-
mane test" in the opinion authored by Justice Williams, a departure
which was also based on language in Abood.
After remand Falk's case again reached the Supreme Court of
Michigan and again three opinions were filled.90 In a per curiam or-
der of the court Falk was denied relief, however, the court stated that:
This proceeding has convinced us all... that certain practices of the State Bar
may warrant closer scrutiny pursuant to our duty to superintend its activities.
We will in the near future, therefore, by separate administrative order appoint
a committee to review those practices and activities and make recommenda-
tions to the Court.9 1
The first opinion, authored by Justice Boyle and joined by Chief
Justice Williams, will be discussed below, the second opinion, au-
thored by Justice Kavanagh and joined by Justice Levin, declined to
express an opinion on the constitutional issues presented and there-
fore will not be discussed in this article. The third opinion, filed by
Justice Ryan and joined by Justices Cavanagh and Brickley, reaf-
firmed the position taken in the original decision; the bar association
could only compel financial support for activities which promote a
compelling state interest and which cannot be accomplished by less
restrictive means.
The Boyle opinion stated that the test which should be applied to
decide the issue was not a strict scrutiny test: "it is clear that the
Supreme Court does not consider the strict scrutiny applied in other
First Amendment cases to be appropriate in cases involving negative
First Amendment rights."92 Instead a two step test was proposed. The
first step determined whether or not the asserted claim implicates the
first amendment; before conduct can be a first amendment infringe-
ment it must first concern "expression." The second part of the test
considers the connection between the individual and the compelled
90. Falk I, 418 Mich. 270, 342 N.W.2d 504 (1983).
91. Id. at 277, 342 N.W.2d at 504. See also Report of the Committee to Review the
State Bar, 112 Wis.2d, 334 N.W.2d 544 (1983).
92. Falk II, 418 Mich. 270, 287, 342 N.W.2d 504, 509 (1983) (emphasis in original). See
Gaebler, supra note 42 for a discussion of the negative first amendment rights.
See also Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 29, 509 A.2d 753, 757 (1986) (citations
omitted) ("The federal right that he asserts is part of that category known as
'negative first amendment rights,' which may be defined as the right to be free
from government action [compelling one] to associate and... to participate in
certain forms of expression").
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expression; if the relationship is attenuated then the government need
not advance a substantial justification for the infringement.93 How-
ever, the more direct the connection between the individual and the
compelled expression, the more important the governmental interest
must be.
'In other words, negative First Amendment cases require a sliding scale ap-
proach to balancing. The more serious the infringement of individual inter-
ests, the more vital the asserted advancement of government interests must be
to outweigh the infringement and vice versa. The question in each case must
be whether the compelled participation in expression infringes unduly upon
individual interests.'
9 4
Applying this test to the non-political activities of the bar it was
determined that Falk failed to establish his burden of showing a first
amendment infringement. 95 However, with regard to political activi-
ties of the bar it was determined that Falk carried the burden of estab-
lishing a first amendment infringement. The asserted first
amendment interest was the compelled participation in expression by
the bar, thus invading Falk's "freedom of conscience and intellect."96
Nevertheless, the first amendment infringement was not considered
to be closely connected to Falk because it involved only indirect finan-
cial contributions. The final step in the analysis, then, was the interest
which the government must show to justify the infringement and
whether it outweighs the infringement. Because the connection be-
tween the infringement and Falk was considered remote and the state
had a substantial interest in the political activities of the bar, the court
found no constitutional infirmities. 97
B. Analysis of Recent Case Law
The Arrow court applied a traditional first amendment test, con-
cluding that the state interest in the lobbying activities of the bar was
not a compelling state interest as contemplated by the Abood case. The
Arrow opinion recognized that the activities which would represent a
compelling state interest were "improving the ethical and educational
standards without reference to the political process."98 Although ap-
plying a strict scrutiny test and identifying certain interests that the
state has in the legal profession which would be compelling, the court
did not propose a methodolgy for determining which activities were
appropriate and which were not. The court's holding in this sense was
very narrow; only that legislative lobbying activities were not compel-
93. Falk II, 418 Mich 270, 288-89, 342 N.W.2d 504, 510-11 (1983).
94. Id. at 292, 342 N.W.2d at 511 (quoting Gaebler, supra note 42, at 1016).
95. Id. at 295, 342 N.W.2d at 513.
96. Id. at 296, 342 N.W.2d at 513.
97. Id. at 299, 342 N.W.2d at 514.
98. Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 462 (D. N.M. 1982) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue,
367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
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ling state interests. Indeed, the court stated, "I do not attempt to delin-
eate all functions and duties of the Bar which do serve important
governmental interests. . . "99 The Falk case provides more guidance
in dealing with this problem.
In Justice Ryan's opinion in Falk I, an approach similar to Arrow
was followed. Justice Ryan also followed a strict scrutiny test, holding
that first amendment infringements are justifiable only if a compel-
ling state interest is furthered, and even then, only if the means used
are the least restrictive to the first amendment rights. The Ryan opin-
ion stated "the regulation of the practice of law, the maintenance of
high standards in the legal profession, and the discharge of the profes-
sion's duty to protect and inform the public, are in the context of the
present challenge, purposes for which the [state has a compelling
interest]."100
Justice Ryan then concluded that several activities of the bar did
not further compelling state interests and that alternatives were avail-
able which would not violate first amendment freedoms. The opinion,
as did Arrow, failed to supplement its conclusions with an analysis of
how impermissible activities could be distinguished from permissible
activities. In Falk II, Justice Ryan's opinion, again, failed to elaborate
on how the determination of which activities were compelling govern-
mental interests and which were not was to be made.
The opposing view was expressed by Justice Williams, in Falk I,
and Justice Boyle, in Falk II. Justice Williams' opinion agreed that
first amendment rights are not absolute, however Justice Williams ar-
gued that first amendment rights give way to state activities that are
merely germane to a compelling state interest. Justice Williams' opin-
ion departed from Justice Ryan's and the Arrow decision when he ar-
gued that the means used to further the state's compelling interest
need only be germane to that interest. This approach would not re-
quire the means to be the least restrictive alternative.
Justice Williams has drawn a distinction between direct and indi-
rect first amendment infringements, holding that direct infringements
require the least restrictive alternative whereas indirect infringe-
ments only require a showing that the activity is "germane" to the
state's interests.101 The opinion read Abood as proposing a new test
for first amendment rights that are indirectly implicated.02 Under
this relaxed standard the opinion concluded that, with the exception
of the selling of the bar membership mailing list, none of the activities
of the bar objected to by Falk violated his first amendment freedoms.
A third test, or rather a refined version of Justice Williams' analy-
99. Id. at 463.
100. Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 114, 305 N.W.2d 201, 217 (1981).
101. Id. at 135-38, 305 N.W.2d at 226-28 (citing Lathrop and Abood).
102. See also Gaebler, supra note 42.
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sis, was proposed in Justice Boyle's opinion in Falk II. Justice Boyle's
opinion refers to the rights infringed as rights of "non-association" and
"non-expression." 103 Under Justice Boyle's reading of Supreme Court
precedent these rights, referred to as negative first amendment rights,
do not implicate a strict scrutiny analysis.1 04 "Because such analysis
[traditional strict scrutiny] is conspicuous by its absence from negative
First Amendment cases, we are unable to conclude that the Supreme
Court would apply it to resolve the case at bar."05 Justice Boyle advo-
cated a balancing test in which "the severity of the injury to the indi-
vidual interest [is balanced] against the magnitude of the government
interest sought to be served by the requirement or regulation."106
Under this test the first inquiry is whether the asserted claim im-
plicates the first amendment, because only conduct characterized as
expression can be the subject of the first amendment protections. The
connection between the individual and the expression is then weighed
against the state's interest in compelling the expression. The more di-
rect the connection the stronger the state interest that is needed to
compel the expression. Conversely, the more attenuated the connec-
tion the requirement of a substantial state interest is lessened.
Justice Boyle stated that the Court, in Abood, did not carefully
weigh the governmental interest because arguably "this can be ex-
plained as an implicit finding that the infringement of individual in-
terests was not severe." 107 However with respect to the financial
support of political and ideological purposes, it was explained, the gov-
ernmental interest in Abood was not strong in this aspect of the com-
pelled contribution.
Under this analysis Justice Boyle would have held that the state's
103. These rights have been referred to as "negative" first amendment rights. See
Gaebler, supra note 42, at 996.
104. Justice Boyle relied heavily on the Supreme Court decisions in West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school board required all stu-
dents and teachers to salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance in the
classroom); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)(Jehovah's Witnesses objected
to the display of the New Hampshire motto "Live Free or Die" on the license
plate of their automobile); Abood, and Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980)(right of citizens to peacefully distribute political material in a pri-
vately owned shopping center).
105. Falk II, 418 Mich. 270, 288, 342 N.W.2d 504, 509 (1983).
106. Id. A similar analysis was advocated in Keller v. State Bar of California, 190 Cal.
App. 3d 1196, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1986). In Keller the court balanced the additional
interference on first amendment rights resulting from compelled financial sup-
port of activities with which one disagrees against the asserted governmental in-
terest, stating "some activities which would not be permissible standing alone
may nonetheless be allowed because they do not increase the infringement al-
ready resulting from compelled, but justified extraction." Id. at -, 226 Cal. Rptr.
at 467.
107. Falk II, 418 Mich. 270, 290, 342 N.W.2d 504, 510 (1983).
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interest outweighed the dissident bar member's negative first amend-
ment rights with respect to political as well as non-political activities.
Therefore three tests have been proposed to deal with the problem
presented by compelled financial support of a bar association's activi-
ties over the objection of dissident members. First the Arrow-Ryan
approach, second, the Williams approach, and finally, the Boyle
approach.
I will treat the analysis proposed by Justices Williams and Boyle as
formulations of the same test. This treatment is based on the fact that
Justice Williams concurred in the opinion filed by Justice Boyle in
Falk II, and because the analyses of the Justices are strikingly similar.
Justice Williams, in Falk I, made an "indirect-direct" distinction in an-
alyzing differing levels of first amendment infringements; similarly in
Falk I, Justice Boyle referred to a "negative-affirmative" distinction
in his analysis of differing levels of first amendment rights. I believe
these distinctions in both decisions are formulations of the same anal-
ysis and therefore they will be treated as such.
The analysis of Justice Boyle places misguided reliance on Profes-
sor Gaebler's interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions dealing
with negative first amendment rights.108 Professor Gaebler's analysis,
as he himself admits, only addressed those rare cases where the first
amendment infringement is a negative infringement (i.e., freedoms of
non-speech and non-association) and where the infringement is slight.
This analysis and balancing of first amendment infringements with
the state's interest is not appropriate where, as in the case of com-
pelled bar membership and financial support, other fundamental, af-
firmative first amendment rights are implicated (i.e., freedoms of
speech and association).
Gaebler, in an effort to explain the Court's decision in Elrod,109
which appeared to be a negative first amendment case, discussed this
point. Failure to explain Elrod would have weakened Gaebler's analy-
sis considerably. "There are other cases, however, which superficially
appear to protect a right to refrain from speech or association, but
which do so in circumstances where such protection is necessary to
protect the more traditional first amendment rights to speak or associ-
ate freely."110
Gaebler, further explained that although their were negative first
amendment rights implicated, the Court was more concerned with the
affirmative first amendment infringements which also were impli-
cated in Elrod.
108. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
109. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
110. Gaebler, supra note 42, at 996 (citing Elrod).
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However, Elrod does not depend on such protection [negative first amend-
ment] to support its result. In fact the decision can easily be justified on more
traditional first amendment grounds. As the Court noted, one of the restraints
on freedom of association was that an employee could maintain affiliation, or
work for the out-party only at the risk of losing his job.1 1 1
The case of compelled bar membership and financial support is
more closely analogized to Elrod than the negative first amendment
cases discussed by Gaebler. The integrated bar implicates negative, as
well as affirmative, first amendment infringements and therefore the
analysis in Elrod is the correct analysis. The integrated bar implicates
the negative first amendment rights of non-association, non-speech
and freedom of conscience. In addition the affirmative rights of speech
and association are implicated through bar integration. The enhanced
review of strict scrutiny in Elrod was the result of the Court's concern
for the affirmative rights which were implicated in that case. This en-
hanced review is, similarly, necessary in the context of the present
challenge in order to prevent further first amendment infringements
of the affirmative rights violated through the integration of a state
bar. The acknowledged infringements on these affirmative rights are
exacerbated by the concomitant infringement of the negative rights
also implicated in compulsory financial support.1 1 2 By alleviating the
infringement on the negative rights, this will in turn make the in-
fringements of the affirmative rights more palatable.
Finally, the compelled financial support of the integrated bar is a
pre-condition to the practice of law. This again resembles Elrod, which
required political support as a pre-condition to county employment.
This fact also leads to the conclusion that the integrated bar implicates
greater first amendment infringements than even Abood. Justice
Ryan, in Falk I, carefully explained the first amendment infringe-
ments in Abood and the greater infringements implicated by an inte-
grated bar.
[W]e are here concerned with the propriety of state-compelled association in,
and financial support of, a public body corporate' as a condition precedent to
the pursuit of one's livelihood as an attorney in this state, in any active legal
capacity. No alternatives, even unpalatable ones, exist for the objecting indi-
vidual attorney.1 1 3
This also supports the conclusion that the Gaebler analysis is faulty
in the context of the current challenge to the integrated bar. Gaebler
builds his analysis around Abood and therefore the analysis is not ap-
propriate if the rights implicated are greater, or the infringements are
more severe, than those implicated in Abood.
111. Id.
112. The Court in Lathrop explicitly recognized that integration implicated the af-
firmative rights of speech and association. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,
867 (1961).
113. Falk 1, 411 Mich. 63, 110-11, 305 N.W.2d 201, 215 (1981).
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Therefore, I submit the appropriate analysis was established in
Elrod and advocated by Justice Ryan. I will now discuss this analysis
and its application to the compelled financial support of an integrated
bar.
IV. A PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Although Arrow and a few other cases have held that bar associa-
tions may not use mandatory dues to support political and ideological
activities with which dissenting members disagree,114 these cases have
failed to provide a framework to analyze and distinguish appropriate
activities from inappropriate activities. In Arrow the court made it
very clear that its decision was limited to legislative lobbying efforts
by the bar and did not express an opinion on the other bar activities.
Similarly, other opinions which have followed a strict scrutiny test
have failed to provide a methodology to follow when making this de-
termination. This portion of the article will provide a framework for
analysis to determine for which activities the bar can finance through
compelled financial support from dissident members.
In this article several of the traditional arguments for and against
bar integration were listed.115 Some of the very reasons which have
been advanced in favor of bar integration have again entered the de-
bate because dissident bar members do not feel such activities are ap-
propriate functions of the bar associations. Therefore, although the
114. See, e.g., Gibson v. The Fla. Bar, 798 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986); Scheneider v.
Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, 565 F. Supp. 963 (D. P.R. 1983) (held stat-
utes compelling financial support of an integrated bar violated the first amend-
ment), vacated and remanded sub nom, Romany v. Colegio De Abogados De
Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984) (district court should have abstained to
allow the Puerto Rico Supreme Court a reasonable time to provide a remedy);
Keller v. State Bar of California, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1196, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1986);
Reynolds v. State Bar of Mont., 660 P.2d 581 (Mont. 1983) (Montana Supreme
Court held that State Bar may not use funds derived from compulsory dues for
lobbying purposes unless it makes provision for refund to members dissenting
from such lobbying); Report of Committee to Review the State Bar, 112 Wis.2d
XIX, 334 N.W.2d 544 (1983) (state supreme court held that certain activities of the
state bar were impermissible and that a rebate system would be instituted to re-
fund dues of objecting members); cf. Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3rd Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1375 (1986) (state university's exaction from stu-
dents of fee to support student-run public interest research group that advances
positions on political and ideological issues infringes first amendment rights of
students who oppose organizations aims); but see The Fla. Bar, 439 So. 2d 213 (Fla.
1983) (state supreme court denied petition to amend Integration Rule which
would limit the manner in which dues are spent). For additional commentary on
this subject see Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitu-
tional Interests In Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTrGERs L. REV. 3 (1983);
Gaebler, supra note 42; Note, "Free Speech'". First Amendment Limitations on
Student Fee Expenditures, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 279 (1984).
115. See supra notes 21-23, and accompanying text.
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debate has evolved from the outright rejection of an integrated bar to
the acceptance of a bar of limited functions, the challenge remains the
same and the question which remains unanswered is: "What are the
appropriate duties and functions of an integrated bar?" In the last sev-
enty-five years the issue has not changed and the debate has now come
full circle. The integration debate must again address this difficult
question. 11 6
Guidance in addressing this question can be found in the early
literature during the integration movement. 117 Much of this early
literature attempted to delineate the bounds of the judiciary's inher-
ent power over the legal profession 18 and the appropriate role of an
integrated bar.1 1 9
This portion of the article will discuss a three step analysis; first, an
explanation of the traditional constitutional test and its requirements;
second, a framework for identifying which state interests served by an
integrated bar rise to the level of compelling state interests; 2 0 and
116. The Sennett Report acknowledged this problem:
Another problem that faces integrated bar associations is the dilemma of
attempting to confine the bar's legislative activities to the 'purposes' of
the bar association. This is the question of the 'germaneness' of the pro-
posed legislation, an area that our body has struggled with over the
years. It is a line-drawing exercise that some persons, including some
judges, have characterized as an exercise in futility.
SENNETr COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 71 at 6.
117. See, e.g., Curtis, The Pros and Cons of an Integrated Bar, 12 LAw Soc. J. 103-06
(1946); Essery, Bar Integration, 19 J. AM JUD. Soc. 174-78 (1936); Garrison, Expe-
rience of Other States with Incorporated Bars, 23 Wis. BAR ASSN. REPoRTS 40-51
(1933).
118. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 3; Shanfield, The Scope of Judicial Independence of
the Legislature in Matters of Procedure and Control of the Bar, XIX St. LouIs L.
REV. 163 (1934).
119. See, e.g., Beardsley, The Incorporated Bar, 3 Mo. BAR J. 67 (1932); Essery, supra
note 117.
120. The appropriate duties and functions of the integrated bar may vary depending
on the manner in which the bar was integrated. To illustrate, a bar integrated
through court rule derives its authority through delegation from the state
supreme court. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 3. "Since the court has ultimate au-
thority over the Nebraska State Bar Association, this paper will not focus on the
internal operations and procedures of the bar association .... The association
derives all its power and authority from the court." Id. at 586 n.116. Therefore the
state supreme court may only delegate that power which it possesses in its inher-
ent power over the judiciary. In order to determine what power the integrated
bar has, then, it may be necessary to first determine what powers the state
supreme court has in its inherent authority over the judiciary. It then follows
that the appropriate duties and functions of a bar integrated in such a manner
may be limited, in the extreme, to only those powers enjoyed by the judiciary.
However, in a state which has been integrated through both legislative enact-
ment and supreme court rule, the separation of powers concerns discussed above
are not a limiting factor on the bar's activities. Nevertheless, the state legislature
may delineate those activities which are to be carried on by the bar and also over-
see those activities. See supra note 1, which discusses how the California legisla-
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finally, a discussion of the least restrictive means component of the
constitutional test.
A. Compelling State Interest Test
Under a traditional first amendment test any governmental in-
fringement of a fundamental right must be justified by a compelling
state interest and, further, the means used to meet the governmental
end must be the least restrictive on first amendment rights.121 This
test is similar to Justice Ryan's opinions in Falk I and II. Therefore the
first step is to identify the first amendment rights implicated by com-
pelled financial support of the bar. The rights infringed upon through
bar integration are freedoms of association, speech and belief.122 The
rights infringed upon through compelled financial support of the bar
are the freedoms of non-expression, non-association, and freedom of
conscience. 2 3
The second step in this analysis is to determine if the state has a
compelling interest which will justify the infringement of first amend-
ment rights. There is one proposition on which all will agree; the state
has a compelling interest in the regulation of the legal profession. The
Arrow decision and all six opinions in the Falk cases agree on this
point.
Lathrop has further established that the government does have a
compelling interest which is furthered through bar integration, how-
ever the inquiry is not complete. The compelling interest served by
the integrated bar must be identified and only those activities which
further the state's compelling interest may be supported by the dues
of dissident bar members. 124 Lathrop and the more recent cases that
ture has maintained close review over the state bar. When the state legislature
attempts to exert its perceived power over this area some state supreme courts
may respond believing that the control of the judiciary and the legal profession
fall under the court's inherent power over the judiciary. For example, one state
legislature has passed a statute integrating the state bar while the judiciary has
held the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers, and
then proceeded to integrate the state bar by court rule, thus asserting dominion
over this area. Cf. In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n., 133 Neb. 283,
275 N.W. 265 (1937) (the Nebraska Supreme Court integrated the state bar in the
face of several failed legislative efforts to integrate the bar through statute); State
ex rel Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N.W.2d 302 (1942) (where the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that a statute which provided standards for bar admissions
infringed upon the court's inherent authority thus holding the statute
unconstitutional).
121. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 703 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 958-73 (2d ed. 1983).
122. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Falk 1, 411 Mich. 63, 111, 305 N.W.2d
201, 215 (1981); SCHNEYER, supra note 32, at 57-68.
123. See Falk I, 418 Mich. 270, 296, 342 N.W.2d 504, 513 (1983); Gaebler, supra note 42,
at 1003-06.
124. One may think that looking to the legislation or court rule establishing the inte-
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have dealt with this issue have failed to delineate those activities of
the integrated bars that encompass compelling state interests and
those activities that do not.
1. Identifying Compelling Governmental Interests served by the
Integrated Bar - A Functional Test.
The analytic thesis of this portion of the article is that the appro-
priate way to frame the issue is a functional approach. This article pro-
poses a method of analysis which may be useful in identifying the state
interests which rise to the level of compelling governmental interests.
This analysis is a functional test.125 This test is one of strict neces-
sity and attempts to identify those activities of the bar that are neces-
sary to assure the proper functioning of the judicial process. Only
those activities necessary to assure the proper functioning of the judi-
ciary are compelling state interests and appropriate activities of the
bar, and may be financed through compulsory dues. A functional role
of the bar association, therefore, would be to assist the judiciary in
carrying out those activities necessary in order to assure the proper
functioning of the judicial system.
Such an analysis would begin with a discussion of the proper func-
grated bar would be an appropriate place to begin this analysis, but most integra-
tion rules and statutes are worded in very broad and general terms. The typical
language is "the advancement of the science of jurisprudence and the effective
administration of justice." See, e.g., Model Bar Organization Act, 10 J. AM JUDICA-
TURE SOC. 110-12 (1926); Bar Organization Act, 4 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc. 111-14
(1920).
125. Black's Law Dictionary defines "function" as "[t]he nature and proper action of
anything; activity appropriate to any business or profession." BLACK'S LAw DIC-
TIONARY 605-06 (5th ed. 1979), see also Rosenblum v. Anglim, 43 F. Supp. 889, 892
(N.D. Cal. 1942). A similar test was applied in the separation of powers context to
determine the extent of the judiciary's inherent authority. See Kalish, supra note
3. The court in Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 509 A.2d 753 (1986), addressing
compelled financial support of a bar association proposed a different but related
test. The Chapman court proposed a substantive versus procedural test stating
that the bar may lobby on issues of procedure but may not lobby to change the
"substantive content of legal rights and obligations." Id. at 37, 509 A.2d at 762
(Souter, J., concurring). Noting a distinction implicit in Lathrop between the ad-
ministration of justice and the content of the law that is administered, id. at 37,
509 A.2d at 763, the court opined that financial support of the former would be
permissible but not that of the latter.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has apparently followed a similar approach in
early cases dealing with the legal profession. In State ex rel Ralston v. Turner, 141
Neb. 556, 4 N.W.2d 302 (1941), the court discussing bar admission qualifications
quoted the following language from a Wisconsin decision: "[s]uch legislative qual-
ifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court
cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the courts for
the proper administration of judicial functions." Id. at 570, 4 N.W.2d at 310
(quoting In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932)) (emphasis added).
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tion of the bar association and the governmental interests it serves.12 6
The analysis would continue by questioning whether a particular bar
association activity is important to assure the proper functioning of
the judicial process or whether it is to advance the public good.127 If
the former, ultimate authority should rest with the judiciary and, pos-
sibly, the bar association; if the latter, the ultimate authority should
rest with the legislature. The legislature is the political branch of the
government that should decide issues relating to the public good. Its
democratic processes are better able to decide these policy questions
independent of the bar association. "The functional approach insists
that public policy judgment be left to the legislature." 2 8
The Supreme Court, implicitly in Lathrop and explicitly in Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar,129 recognized that the state interest over
lawyers is compelling. The concurrence in Falk I identified the com-
pelling state interests promoted by the integrated bar as the "adminis-
tration of justice and the advancement of jurisprudence."130
Recognizing that such principles are susceptible to varying interpreta-
tions it was stated:
On the one hand, the bar represents the collective experience of legal experts
in many fields, and its views on legislation as substantive as revisions of the
criminal code, changes to the divorce laws, and no-fault insurance may serve
compelling state interests. On the other hand, the threatened and actual intru-
sions upon individual members' First Amendment rights occasioned by com-
pelled support of substantive issues to which they are opposed may make it
proper or even constitutionally necessary to limit this broad statement of pur-
126. One leading scholar has argued, using a similar functional approach, that bar as-
sociation membership is not strictly necessary to assure the proper functioning of
the judicial process. Kalish, supra note 3, at 599. "In view of the Association's
special status as a unified bar... [T]he Association should limit its activities
before the General Court to those matters which are related directly to the effi-
cient administration of the judicial system; the composition and operation of the
courts; and the education, ethics, competence, integrity and regulation as a body,
of the legal profession." Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. at 24, 32, 509 A.2d 753, 759
(1986).
127. This test is similar to one utilized to determine when the judiciary can mandate
the appropriation of funds for its use. See Wayne Circuit Judges v. County of
Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 23, 172 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1969) (the court held that it could
only demand money if its absence would impair the "effectively continuing func-
tion of the court"). Lobbying on substantive issues of social policy are not appro-
priate bar activities. "Despite the social significance of [such proposals], there is
no reason to believe that [their] enactment would have any effect on the integrity
or competence of the bar or bench." Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 37, 509
A.2d 753, 763 (1986).
128. Kalish, supra note 3, at 599.
129. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). "We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in
the practice of professions within their boundaries .... The interest of the States
in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 'of-
ficers of the courts.'" Id. at 792-93 (emphasis added).
130. Falk I, 411 Mich. 63, 145, 305 N.W.2d 201, 231 (1981).
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pose to the promotion of issues which are directly related to the practice of
law and administration of justice as defined in their narrowest senses ... or to
eliminate entirely bar legislative activities funded by compulsory dues.1 3 1
A functional analysis of the bar association would result in a very
narrow reading of the words "administration of justice and advance-
ment of jurisprudence." Activities which would meet the functional
analysis proposed herein might include: bar admissions, attorney disci-
pline, continuing legal education, prevention of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law and other activities directly related to and having an
immediate impact upon the judicial process. Activities that would
clearly not be in accord with a functional analysis would include such
activities as: lobbying efforts, political activities, bar social functions,
and other related activities that are self-serving activities of the bar
and the attorney as an individual. These activities do not embrace any
governmental interests in the legal profession and could not justify
any first amendment infringement. Further, these activities are not
necessary to assure the proper functioning of the judicial process and,
hence, do not meet the requirements of a functional analysis.
The application of the functional analysis proposed herein will not
be easy. The demarcation between those activities necessary for the
proper functioning of the judicial process and those that are not poses
difficult and complex questions. The scope of the "judicial process"
and the meaning of the words "strict necessity" are also issues that are
difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, if the courts are going to begin to
address these difficult questions there must be a starting point or an
analytical framework in order to keep the inquiry focused. As I have
already shown, the integration debate has been circular and has not
made any progress over the last seventy-five years. In order to make
the needed progress in this area a framework such as the functional
approach proposed in this article is needed.
B. Least Restrictive Means
If an activity passes the muster of the functional test as I have pro-
posed, the means employed to further the compelling state interest
must nevertheless be the least restrictive alternative available to the
government to further the state interest.
In the integrated bar context there are alternatives available to the
government which would further the state's interest in the legal pro-
fession while at the same time alleviate first amendment infringe-
ments. These alternatives would alleviate the first amendment
associational problems of the integrated bar. Compulsory bar member-
ship is not the least restrictive alternative. The government could al-
low dissident bar members to withdraw their bar membership and
131. Id. at 172, 305 N.W.2d at 244.
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require them to pay a "service fee" to the bar association equal in
amount to their pro rata share of the costs for bar activities which they
must bear as a responsible member of the profession. This would be
akin to the agency shop agreement considered in Abood. However, it
must also be assured that those who choose not to join the bar are
paying for activities of the bar which serve only compelling state inter-
ests. Such a proposal would eliminate the problem of "free riders" in
the profession while still protecting the first amendment rights of all
attorneys. You will recall that the free rider problem was a very im-
portant consideration of the Court in Abood.
Short of allowing dissident members to withdraw from the bar as-
sociation and make bar membership voluntary, other less restrictive
alternatives might entail a prohibition on activities that do not meet a
compelling state interest or the use of procedural safeguards to lessen
any first amendment infringements from compelled financial support
of the bar.
C. Procedural Protections
In addition to a constitutional problem, the compelled support of
activities objectionable to dissident members presents a procedural
problem of apportioning the dues which may be compelled over objec-
tion and those that cannot. I will now return to two cases that have
previously been discussed, however in this portion of the article spe-
cific reference will be made only to the relief proposed by the courts.
The cases are Abood and Arrow.
Again as a reminder, Abood dealt with compelled financial support
of a union's activities over objection by dissenting non-members that
were compelled to finance the collective bargaining activities of the
union. The Supreme Court held that the dissident non-members could
only be required to finance those activities of the union which were
germane to its collective bargaining activities. Since the union was us-
ing the dissident's dues for other purposes, the Court had to discuss an
appropriate remedy.
A remedy in Abood had to be tailored which would provide for con-
tributions from dissident members for activities germane to collective
bargaining, yet it must also ensure that dissidents were not financially
supporting activities unrelated to collective bargaining. It was clear
that limiting the use of actual dollars collected from dissenting em-
ployees to collective bargaining purposes was not an adequate remedy.
To do so would result in dissenting employees paying a disproportion-
ate share of the collective bargaining activities.132
132. See also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753-54
(1963). It is clear that merely limiting the use of dissenting member's dues to
activities which further a compelling state interest without a reduction in the
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Therefore, the Court was required to discuss other alternate forms
of relief. As a preliminary matter, only those dissenters having made
it affirmatively known to the union that they opposed the expenditure
of funds for political and ideological purposes would be entitled to re-
lief because "dissent is not to be presumed."1 33
The Court proposed two forms of relief that would be appropriate
under the circumstances and which were also discussed in Street. The
relief the Court proposed was:
First, an injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed by each
complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys to be spent by the union
for political purposes, which is so much of the moneys exacted from him as is
the proportion of the union's total expenditures made for such political activi-
ties to the union's total budget; and second, restitution of a fraction of union
dues paid equal to the fraction of total union expenditures that were made for
political purposes opposed by the employee.
1 3 4
This early view on the appropriate type of remedy was later fol-
lowed by the courts that dealt with this similar problem in the bar
association context. For example Arrow followed the principles estab-
lished in Abood in forming the appropriate relief for a dissident bar
member who objects to the use of her dues for activities which do not
further a compelling state interest.
In the first opinion in the Arrow case the court held that a bar
association could not expend compulsory dues on legislative and lob-
bying activities. In a subsequent opinion in the same action the parties
agreed to a stipulation which would resolve the issue.135 The stipula-
tion provided:
The State Bar of New Mexico will adopt a check-off system to fund future
dues is an unconstitutional remedy. Nevertheless, this is exactly the type of rem-
edy which was recommended by the SENNETT COMMITTEE REPORT. The SENNETT
COMMITTEE REPORT recommended that:
A. That the House of Delegates should take action to allow the Bar
Association to continue lobbying efforts without the spector of constitu-
tional litigation being continually raised, and;
B. The the Associaiton [sic] adopt a system whereby the members of
the Bar can 'opt out' of the Bar Association lobbying efforts, and;
C. That the Association adopt a system whereby the funds of Bar mem-
bers who do not desire to be involved in lobbying efforts can be placed in
a segregated account to be used for the general betterment of the admin-
istration of justice.
SENNETT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 71 at 9. See also infra notes 165-70 and
accompanying text.
133. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977). The requirement that a
dissenter must make it affirmatively known that they opposed the expenditure of
funds for political purposes has been rejected and this burden must now be
shouldered by the organization collecting the compulsory dues.
134. Id. at 238 (quoting Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 at 774-75
(1956)). See also Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963) (a similar remedy
was fashioned in Street).
135. Arrow v. Dow, 554 F. Supp. 1086 (D. N.M. 1983).
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lobbying whereby those Bar members who disagreed with the use of their
funds for lobbying purposes could obtain, after the close of the legislative ses-
sion, a pro rata refund of their portion of Bar dues spent on lobbying. Under
this check-off system, all Bar members will pay their full dues as assessed, the
Bar will issue a lobbying report as soon as practicable after the lobbying activi-
ties have concluded for the year (said report to include a list of issues lobbied
upon and the Bar's position on each issue), and the Bar will advise its member-
ship that those members who disagreed with the use of a portion of their dues
for lobbying can request and receive a pro rata refund.
1 3 6
However, the stipulated remedy proposed in Arrow is clearly not
satisfactory given the requirements in Abood and the subsequent opin-
ion in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
C/erks,'a7 for three reasons. First, under the stipulation the Bar would
gain the use of the dissenting members funds until the close of the
legislative session and the eventual refund is tendered. Second, the
Arrow court held that legislative lobbying activities were not appropri-
ate activities of the bar, therefore, bar dues should not be used for this
purpose. If the Bar is to perform these functions it must do so through
voluntary contributions. To allow the bar to exact funds for purposes
that cannot be compulsorily financed and then use these funds until
the end of the session does not lessen the first amendment infringe-
ment. And third, if a "check-off" system is to be used, then those
members that desire to fund legislative lobbying efforts should be
checked off not those members dissenting from such activity. The dis-
senter should not be the party who must come forward to prevent her
dues from being used in an impermissible manner. In addition, the
stipulation would require the dissident member to check-off each ac-
tivity which she opposed. Such a system would place an onerous bur-
den on the dissenting member.
The Supreme Court in Abood suggested that the system, advocated
in Arrow, would not be appropriate. "To require greater specificity
would confront an individual ... with the dilemma of relinquishing
either his right to withhold his support of ideological causes to which
he objects or his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public
disclosure."13 8 Thus the dissenting member must be given the oppor-
tunity for a general objection which would not require a specific
enumeration of those activities to which she objected. Further, any
136. Id. at 1086-87.
137. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
138. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977). The Court similarly recog-
nized in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976), that compelled disclosure of polit-
ical campaign contributions and expenditures "can seriously infringe on privacy
of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." See also Gibson v.
The Fla. Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1570 n.5 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Lawyers would only have
to notify the Bar of a general disagreement, since the first amendment also pro-
tects an individuals right not to disclose his beliefs.") (emphasis in original).
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burden created by such a system must be borne by the bar association
and not by the captive member.
The remedies which have been fashioned in virtually every case
holding that a bar association can only spend compulsory dues for lim-
ited purposes have relied on the decision in Abood.139 Although cor-
rect at the time, these cases and the remedies proposed are no longer
adequate. The Supreme Court's decision in Ellis v. Brotherhood of
Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks 140 has expressed an opinion
on the procedural remedy which would limit further first amendment
infringements caused from exacting compulsory dues.
I will now address two post-Abood decisions that are useful in guid-
ing the courts on this difficult issue. The first is Ellis and the second is
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.141
The question presented in Ellis was essentially the same issue
which was presented, but not decided, in Street. Specifically the con-
stitutionality of union "expenditures for activities in the area between
the costs which led directly to the complaint as to 'free riders', and the
expenditures to support union political activities."142
The union adopted a rebate scheme to return a portion of the dues
assessed which represented the pro rata portion of fees used for polit-
ical and ideological purposes. 14 3 The dissident members challenged
the adequacy of the rebate scheme and also the legality of six specific
union expenditures which fell between the extremes identified in
Hanson and Street. The challenged expenditures were: a quadrennial
convention, litigation not related to collective bargaining, union publi-
cations, social activities, death benefits for employees, and organizing
efforts.144
The Court first considered the adequacy of the rebate program in-
stituted by the union as a means of protecting the rights of dissident
members for monies spent on political and ideological purposes. The
Court recognized that "[b]y exacting and using full dues, then re-
funding months later the portion that it was not allowed to exact in
the first place, the union effectively charges the employees for activi-
ties that are outside the scope of the statutory authorization." 14 5 Find-
ing the system to be inadequate, the Court expressed an opinion on
the appropriate remedial measures to be taken by unions in this
situation.
The only justification for this union borrowing would be administrative con-
139. See supra note 114.
140. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
141. 475 U.S. 292, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
142. Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769-70 (1961).
143. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 440 (1984).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 444.
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venience. But there are readily available alternatives, such as advance reduc-
tion of dues and/or interest bearing escrow accounts, that place only the
slightest additional burden, if any, on the union. Given the existence of accept-
able alternatives, the union cannot be allowed to commit dissenters' funds to
improper uses even temporarily.
1 4 6
The Court then considered the specific activities to which the dis-
senters objected. The Court upheld the use of dissenter's fees for so-
cial activities, union publications, and a quadrennial union convention
to elect union officers and conduct business related to collective bar-
gaining. 47 The Court, however, found that the organizing activities of
the union and litigation expenses not related to collective bargaining
were not authorized.148 Since the Court found that the Act allowing
the union shop only authorized the compelled support of three activi-
ties, the first amendment review was limited to those three activities.
However, the first amendment review of these activities was very cur-
sory and had the practical effect of a summary dismissal of these
claims.
The Court noted that the very existence of the union-shop im-
pinged first amendment freedoms but that these infringements were
outweighed by the strong governmental interest in industrial peace.
The Court then held that the added financial support of the three ac-
tivities complained of did not involve additional infringement beyond
that already accepted.149 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has
imposed additional procedural safeguards to protect dissenters and
limit first amendment infringements.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court imposed additional require-
ments to assure that proper procedural safeguards are given to those
who disagree with the manner in which compulsory funds are spent
by labor unions. 150 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson '51 addressed
the constitutionality of the procedures adopted by the Chicago Teach-
146. Id.
147. Id. at 448-51.
148. Id. at 451-55.
149. Id. at 456-57. The Court summarily dismissed the petitioners first amendment
claims. In a perceptive dissent Justice Powell stated:
The reasoning of the Court is not clear to me. It agrees, as it must, that
the First Amendment 'does limit the uses to which the union can put
funds obtained from dissenting employees,'.... Nevertheless the Court's
conclusion with respect to convention expenses appears to ignore that
constraint .... Where funds are used to further political causes with
which nonmember employees may disagree, the decisions of this Court
are explicit that nonmember employees may not be compelled to bear
such expenditures. The Court's conclusionary disposition of petitioners'
argument ignores the force of these decisions.
Id. at 461 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Keller v. State Bar of California, 190
Cal. App. 3d 1196, 1214, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448, 468 (1986).
150. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
151. Id.
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ers Union to draw the necessary line between those activities which
could be financed through compulsory sources and those that could
not and also to respond to objections concerning the manner in which
the line was drawn. The Court's decision has placed new requirements
on this type of procedural safeguard.
The Court stated that "the 'advance reduction of dues' was inade-
quate because it provided nonmembers with inadequate information
about the basis for their proportionate share."152 This language, taken
in conjunction with the language which follows, forms the basis for
the first added requirement imposed in the Chicago Teachers Union
case.
Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concerns for the First Amendment
rights at stake, also dictate that the potential objectors be given sufficient in-
formation to gauge the propriety of the union's fee. Leaving the non-union
employee in the dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee - and
requiring them to object in order to receive information - does not ade-
quately protect the careful distinctions drawn in Abood.1 5 3
This requirement thus places the burden upon the union, or by
analogy the bar association, to provide dissenters with adequate infor-
mation to determine how the organization apportioned the expendi-
tures on authorized and unauthorized activities. This requirement was
deemed necessary to allow the "individual whose First Amendment
rights are being affected.., a fair opportunity to identify the impact of
the governmental action on his interests and to assert a meritorious
First Amendment claim."154
The second requirement imposed in Chicago Teachers Union was
the requirement of an impartial decisionmaker.
Finally, the original Union procedure was also defective because it did not
provide for a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker.
Although we have not so specified in the past, we now conclude that such a
requirement is necessary. 1 5 5
Although the union had established a 100% escrow arrangement
for contributions exacted from dissenters, thus preventing their use
for impermissible purposes, the Court held that the procedure was in-
adequate because "it does not provide an adequate explanation for the
advance reduction of dues, and it does not provide a reasonably
prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker." 156
With all of these cases in mind, Abood, Ellis, and Chicago Teachers
Union, I will now propose a procedural safeguard conforming to all
the requirements of these Supreme Court mandates.
152. Id. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 1075.
153. Id. at-, 106 S. Ct. at 1076.
154. Id. at-, 106 S. Ct. at 1074.
155. Id. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 1076 (footnotes omitted).
156. Id. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 1077.
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D. The Proposed Remedy
If the conclusion is reached that a dissident bar member cannot be
compelled to financially support bar association activities which she
opposes, then there remains a procedural problem of how the fees will
be apportioned. There must be a procedure devised which will assure
that the objecting member is paying for the activities of the bar fur-
thering a compelling state interest, yet it must also provide for a pro-
cess of apportioning the dues and returning that portion representing
the pro rata share which would have been spent unconstitutionally.
The final issue addressed by this article is the appropriate procedure
to insure that bar expenditures are not being compelled over objection
and that a constitutional process is developed conforming to the con-
stitutional rights of the dissident bar member.
I propose a procedure that informs all members of their right to
object to bar expenditures and that places the burden of informing the
bar members on the bar association. Additionally, the procedure
would require the bar to place the dues of an objecting member into
an escrow account until an accounting could be conducted. After the
accounting, the bar association could assess a percentage of its costs,
which represents those activities determined to further a compelling
governmental interest to all members. All other activities of the bar
must be financed by voluntary contributions. During the first year in
operation the percentage of the dues appropriately compelled would
be set-off against the dues held in escrow, with the balance being re-
turned along with the accrued interest to the dissident member. In
subsequent years, the dues assessed to dissident members would be
the amount which represented compelled assessments in the previous
year, with any shortfall at the close of the year being charged to the
dissident and any excess being returned, again with interest.
The final requirements of the procedural remedy would include
detailed information be given to the dissenters explaining how their
compulsory obligations were calculated. Also, the bar association
would have to provide an impartial decisionmaker to render, in a rea-
sonably prompt manner, a decision concerning the dissident members
objections. These final requirements would conform to the Court's de-
cision in Chicago Teachers Union.
Another remedy exists which would provide the greatest constitu-
tional safeguards for dissenters. This remedy entails completely
prohibiting a state bar from engaging in any activity which does not
meet a compelling state interest. Such a remedy was urged by the Pe-
titioner in Petition of Chapman15 7 and ultimately adopted by the
court. "[P]etitioner here argues strenuously that dues abatement of
the sort suggested by the United States Supreme Court in various
157. 128 N.H. 24, 509 A.2d 753 (1986).
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union shop cases . .. is an inadequate remedy because the [bar will]
still be able to engage in the complained of legislative activity."15s The
available remedies were further elaborated on in a concurring opinion.
The option of eliminating all lobbying as a remedy was summarily dis-
missed because to do so "would ignore the real public service that the
[bar] provides when it lobbies on issues that are germane to its respon-
sibilities as a unified bar association." 159 The second option discussed
was a system of dues abatement. This option was considered unsatis-
factory because "calculating a proper reduction of dues would be ex-
tremely complicated" and "after the dues are reduced by some trifling
amount, a dissenter is still compelled to belong to an association offi-
cially advocating views with which he disagrees, on a subject outside of
the scope of those responsibilities that are accepted as justifying his
mandatory membership."160
The favored remedy was to impose limits on the scope of lobbying
activities. The concurrence explained the predominance of the remedy
of dues reduction and the reluctance to allow injunctive relief in the
analogous labor cases. The reluctance to use injunctive relief was ex-
plained as being consistent with the Congressional policy behind the
Norris-Laguardia Act,161 and the concern that an injunction "against a
union's political or ideological activities would affect the first amend-
ment rights of those members who desire to associate for political pur-
poses."162 Such constraints were not applicable in the context of
compelled financial support of a bar association. First, there is no Con-
gressional policy forbidding injunctive relief and, second, the first
amendment rights of those that favor the questioned bar activity will
not be threatened because of the availability of voluntary associations
"that would lend [themselves] to the purposes of such opposition, and
there are genuine opportunites for effective organization devoted to
the particular legislation in issue."1 63 Therefore there would be no
legal obstacles to prevent a court from granting injunctive relief and
limiting the legislative activities of a bar association.
A fourth remedy which has only been discussed once is the remedy
of requiring the state bar officers to reimburse funds used for im-
proper lobbying. The court in Keller held that "[t]he individual de-
fendants [bar officers] may be held, upon a proper showing, to
reimburse the State Bar for expenditure of funds which are in excess
of the bar's statutory powers."164
158. Id. at 30-31, 509 A.2d at 758.
159. Id. at 40, 509 A.2d at 764 (Souter, J., concurring).
160. Id., 509 A.2d at 765.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1982).
162. Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 40, 509 A.2d 753, 765 (1986).
163. Id.
164. Keller v. State Bar of California, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1196, 1214, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448,
473 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
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E. Nebraska's Proposed Remedy
The Sennett Committee was formed to study the issue of using
mandatory bar dues for legislative lobbying. The Sennett Committee
Report stated:
A review of these authorities has convinced us that the current policies of the
Nebraska State Bar Association are inadequate. Without attempting to sum-
marize the holdings of the above cases, we would simply note that the bar
associations have not been winning these lawsuits. We believe that it is fair to
say that in light of the authorities listed above, the Nebraska State Bar Associ-
ation would have a very difficult time defending its current lobbying
practices. 1
6 5
The Sennett Committee Report discussed four possible solutions to
the constitutional problem. First, the association could drop its legis-
lative activities altogether. This would in turn eliminate the legisla-
tive budget of the association. Second, the association could resort to
voluntary funding of legislative activities. Under such a plan, contri-
butions would not be a part of the regular dues collected. To further
this plan, a separate non-profit corporation could be organized to carry
out the legislative activities. The third option, which was the option
recommended to and adopted by the House of Delegates involved a
check-off system to accomodate dissenters. The final option consid-
ered by the committee was a rebate system.166
165. SENNE~r COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 71 at 5.
166. Id. at 7. The fourth option was described by the committee as follows:
The last course of action would be a rebate system. Here a dissenter is
not allowed to reduce his dues by any amount spent for legislation pur-
poses. Rather, to protect the dissenter's First Amendment constitutional
rights, the dissenter may, by affirmative action only, petition the Bar
Association claiming an aliquot refund of dues expended for the legisla-
tive effort. The rebate could be limited to amounts spent to lobby a spe-
cific bill or bills, or the rebate could relate to the legislative budget
considered as a whole. Absent affirmative action, a dissenter will not en-
joy any reduction in total dues assessed.
Id. at 7-8 (emphasis supplied). It is absolutely clear that the fourth option consid-
ered by the Committee would violate Supreme Court precedent which has been
already discussed in this article. First, the burden of affirmatively objecting to an
improper bar expenditure cannot be placed on the dissenting bar member. Fur-
ther, it is clear that a dissenter is not required to specify the activities with which
she disagrees. See supra notes 138, 153-55 and accompanying text. "Disclosure of
the specific causes to which an individual employee is opposed (which necessarily
discloses, by negative implication, those causes the employee does support) may
subject him to 'economic reprisal .... threat of physical coercion, and other mani-
festations of public hostility,' and might dissuade him from exercising the right to
withhold support 'because of fear of exposure of [his] beliefs ... and of the conse-
quences of this exposure.'" Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,241 (1976)
(quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958)). It is
difficult to understand why the committee members would even discuss such
clearly flawed solutions. Indeed the Committee Report expressly noted some of
the requirements imposed by the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, but failed to incorporate those requirements in its recommen-
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The Sennett Committee proposed a rule change for the Supreme
Court Rules which would implement the recommendation of the
Committee. The Rule as amended by the House of Delegates
provides:
Section 4(A): LOBBYING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(i) The Bar Association may use dues to analyze and disseminate to its mem-
bers information on proposed or pending legislative proposals.
(ii) All lobbying activities shall be subject to the following restrictions. The
annual dues notice shall offer the members of the State Bar an opportunity to
direct that the stated amount of their dues intended for lobbying activities be
placed instead in a restricted account. Funds from this account shall be budg-
eted by the Executive Committee for activities which will promote the admin-
istration of justice or improvement of the legal system. The established
budget for lobbying activities shall be reduced by the amount that is directed
to the restricted account.1 6 7
This Rule change is currently pending approval of the Nebraska
Supreme Court. The Sennett Committee felt that the adoption of
their recommendations and proposed rule would cure the constitu-
tional problems for which the Committee was organized. I believe,
however, that the proposed rule is inadequate for several reasons.
First, the rule only limits lobbying activities of the bar. Thus, other
activities with which a bar dissenter may disagree are not dealt with in
the proposed rule. Second, the rule also fails to establish an impartial
decisionmaker as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson.168 Third, the rule as proposed also places
an undue burden on the dissenter.169 The rule requires the dissenter
to "opt out." The burden on the dissenters, however, could be allevi-
ated by requiring those bar members that wish to support the bar's
legislative lobbying efforts to "opt in." Such an allocation of the bur-
den would conform to the Supreme Court's mandates. The practical
effect of such an "opt-in" rule would establish a method of financing
lobbying activities similar to a system of voluntary contributions.
Since the established budget for lobbying activities will be reduced
by the amount of the dissenter's dues that are placed in the restricted
account, the rule does prevent the dissenters from subsidizing the
bar's lobbying activities. The result is that only those who support lob-
bying activities are financing these activities. However, this does not
negate the fact that the coercive powers of the bar are being used to
implement the program. The proposed rule also has the effect of al-
lowing the bar to "appropriate" funds for lobbying purposes. The bar
will be able to arrive at its desired level of lobbying activity by consid-
dations to the House of Delegates. See SENNETT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
71 at 4.
167. SENNETT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 71.
168. 475 U.S. 292, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
169. See supra note 166.
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ering the number of expected dissenters when setting the initial
budget for lobbying activities. Thus, reducing the budget by the
amounts placed in the restricted account from the artificially inflated
initial budget will still result in a level of lobbying activity which is
determined by the bar leadership and not the bar membership. The
level of lobbying activity under the proposed rule is likely to be higher
than the level of lobbying activity under a purely voluntary system of
contributions. And this disparity can only be attributed to the coer-
cive powers of the state bar in implementing the proposed rule.
The proposed rule also does not address the concern that the posi-
tion of the bar will be imputed to dissenting bar members whether or
not they are financing the lobbying activities of the bar.
Finally, the proposed rule does not provide for restitution to the
dissenter of the portion of her bar dues which correspond to the per-
centage used for lobbying activities. Although not clear, the decisions
of the Supreme Court seem to contemplate restitution to the dis-
senter.170 Thus, placing these funds in a restricted account may not
cure the constitutional violations. Because these problems still exist
in the implementation of the proposed rule it may have been prefera-
ble for the bar to adopt either the first or second option considered by
the Sennett Committee. These options were the elimination of bar
legislative activities altogether or, alternatively, voluntary funding of
legislative activities which would be carried out by a separate non-
profit corporation organized for that sole purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, this article has developed the evolution of the inte-
grated bar debate from the early rejection of an integrated bar to the
acceptance of an integrated bar of limited duties and functions. I have
analyzed the cases which are applicable to the integrated bar in order
to better understand the current challenge. The decisions in Hanson,
Street, Lathrop, and, most importantly, Abood help to understand the
issue, but fail to provide a framework for analysis of this current chal-
lenge to the compelled financial support of bar association activities
which are disapproved by dissident members.
None of these cases explicitly identify the type of analysis used to
decide the issue. After careful analysis of these and other Supreme
Court precedents, I submit that in order to compel financial support of
its activities the bar association must meet the burden of establishing
that the objectionable activity furthers a compelling governmental
interest.
A discussion of the post-Abood cases which have applied the Abood
analysis in the bar association context has also shown that none of the
170. See supra notes 134, 145, 146, 158 and accompanying text.
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courts which have decided the issue have proposed an acceptable ana-
lytical framework for parsing out those activities for which the bar
may compel financial support over the objections of dissenting mem-
bers. I have therefore proposed a functional test for determining
which of those activities are essential activities of the bar and which
may be supported by mandatory bar dues. The activities identified
through such a test further a compelling governmental interest. This
test relies on language in the Lathrop decision as well as an adaptation
of a similar analysis by an early commentator. Stated briefly, this
analysis requires any bar activity in which financial support may be
compelled to be so strictly related to the proper functioning of the ju-
dicial process that without the activity the judicial process would be
hampered. This is a test of strict necessity, and is a very heavy burden
to be met by the bar associations. 171 Any activities of the bar that do
not meet the test proposed must be funded through voluntary contri-
butions or other non-compulsory financial support. And, in addition to
furthering a compelling governmental interest, the means invoked
must be the least restrictive alternative available.
If it is determined that an activity is appropriately financed by all
members of the bar the constitutional analysis is still not yet com-
plete; there may also be constitutional infirmities in the procedural
protections afforded to those dissident bar members who object to the
use of their bar dues for other purposes. The Supreme Court in Ellis
has established guidelines to which states must adhere in order to
avoid further first amendment infringement. The principles in Ellis
make it clear that any procedure employed must not allow the im-
proper use of dues by the bar association, even if only temporarily.
The procedure which I propose places the burden on the bar associ-
ation to inform all members of their right to object to bar expendi-
tures.172 The procedure would also require the bar association to place
the dues of an objecting member into an escrow or other interest bear-
ing account until an accounting could be conducted. After the account-
ing, the bar association could assess to all members a percentage of its
costs which represents those activities determined to further a com-
pelling interest. All other activities of the bar would have to be fi-
nanced by voluntary contributions or other non-compulsory financial
support. During the first year in operation, the percentage of the dues
171. "Where it can reasonably be argued that an issue is outside the scope of its au-
thority, the [bar] should take no position on the matter. Where substantial una-
nimity does not exist or is not known to exist within the bar as a whole,
particularly with regard to issues affecting members' economic self-interest, the
[bar] should exercise caution." Petition of Chapman, 128 N.H. 24, 32, 509 A.2d 753,
759 (1986).
172. "[K]eeping in mind that it is the Bar which bears the burden of proving the valid-
ity of its lobbying expenditures." Keller v. State Bar of California, 190 Cal. App.
3d 1196, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448, 469 (1986).
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appropriately compelled would be set-off against the dues held in es-
crow, with the balance being returned along with the accrued interest
to the dissident member. In subsequent years, the dues assessed to dis-
sident members would be the amount which represented compelled
assessments in the previous year, with any shortfall being charged to
the dissident and any excess being returned.
These procedures would insure the dissident bar member is only
paying for those activities of the bar which further the states' compel-
ling interests in the legal profession; while limiting further first
amendment infringement.
In this article I have essentially developed the evolution of the in-
tegration debate, developed an analysis that may be useful in the con-
text of the current challenge, and proposed a system for protecting the
dissident bar member's interest in the manner in which his dues are
spent. I hope to have contributed to the commentary in this difficult
area in a productive way. Even if my analysis should prove faulty or
unworkable it provides a starting point and provides the proper direc-
tion and focus the inquiry should take.
Larry J. Rector '87
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